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AN ERROR AND AN EVIL: 
  THE STRANGE HISTORY OF  
IMPLIED COMMERCE POWERS 
 DAVID S. SCHWARTZ* 
An underspecified doctrine of implied “reserved powers of the states” has been 
deployed through U.S. constitutional history to prevent the full application of 
McCulloch v. Maryland’s concept of implied powers to the enumerated 
powers—in particular, the Commerce Clause.  The primary rationales for these 
implied limitations on implied federal powers stem from two eighteenth and 
nineteenth century elements of American constitutionalism.  First, the inability 
of pre-twentieth century judges to conceptualize a workable theory of concurrent 
federal and state power made it seem constitutionally necessary to limit the 
Commerce Clause and to refrain from applying the concept of implied powers to 
the Commerce Clause in order to preserve a substantial scope for state regulation.  
Second, because slavery so obviously fed into interstate and international trade, 
a robust application of implied powers to the Commerce Clause could naturally 
lead to a congressional power to “interfere with” the institution of slavery within 
the states.  Antebellum judges and political leaders saw the implied limitation 
of such a power as an inescapable element of the constitutional bargain. 
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These twin supports of the implied limitation concept have been eliminated 
from American constitutional law, yet the concept persists, with potentially 
significant consequences.  In National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius, the 2012 Affordable Care Act case, for example, five 
Justices maintained that there is an implied limitation against regulating 
economic “inactivity.”  The justification offered for this is an abstract concept of 
federalism that is largely detached from the once powerful, but now defunct, 
principles of constitutional politics that sustained it. 
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JUSTICE BREYER:  So I’m focusing just on the Commerce 
Clause . . . [a]nd I look back into history, and I think if we look back 
into history, we see sometimes Congress can create commerce out of 
nothing.  That’s the national bank, which was created out of nothing 
to create other commerce out of nothing.  I look back into history, 
and I see it seems pretty clear that if there are substantial effects on 
interstate commerce, Congress can act . . . . 
MR. CLEMENT:  Well, Justice Breyer, let me start at the beginning 
of your question with McCulloch.  McCulloch was not a commerce 
power case.1 
 
In exercising the authority conferred by [the Commerce Clause] of 
the Constitution, Congress is powerless to regulate anything which 
is not commerce . . . . 
 —United States Supreme Court in Carter v Carter Coal Co.2 
 
                                               
 1. Transcript of Oral Argument at 62, 64, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. 
Florida, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (No. 11-398). 
 2. 298 U.S. 238, 297 (1936). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Much of American constitutional history is a 230-year debate about 
the scope of federal power to regulate interstate commerce.  According 
to the conventional understanding, the Supreme Court narrowly 
defined interstate commerce to mean trade—buying and selling in 
interstate markets—plus interstate commercial travel and shipping.  
Then, starting in the year of our Constitution’s sesquicentennial, 1937, 
the Court shifted ground and reinterpreted interstate commerce to 
mean, essentially, the U.S. economy.3  This so-called “New Deal 
Settlement” was completed in 1942, in the Court’s famous Wickard v. 
Filburn4 decision, which redefined the commerce power by authorizing 
Congress to regulate intrastate activities that substantially affect 
interstate commerce.5  Then, beginning with United States v. Lopez6 in 
1995, the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts launched a “federalism 
revival” that clarified the “substantial effects test”—or “trim[med]” it 
“at its edges”7—to refer to the regulation of economic matters, which 
must be activities rather than (somewhat absurdly) “inactivities.”8  
Although the so-called “New Deal Settlement” and its broad 
interpretation of the commerce power remains largely intact, the five 
conservative Justices in National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius9 (NFIB) in 2012 seemed to turn the clock back to at least 1938, 
if not 1936, when ruling that free-riding in the national health care 
market was not reachable as interstate commerce regulation.10 
That holding strangely ignored McCulloch v. Maryland,11 the 
foundational case to all participants in federalism debates since the 
early 1900s.  Chief Justice Roberts, for example, purported to rely on 
McCulloch in providing the decisive fifth vote for the proposition that 
requiring uninsured people to buy health insurance violated the limits 
on the commerce power.12  Yet McCulloch’s analysis of implied powers 
                                               
 3. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937). 
 4. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 5. Id. at 124–25. 
 6. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 7. Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 160 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 8. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59; see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 
U.S. 519, 556–57 (2012). 
 9. 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
 10. Id. at 588 (noting that the individual mandate cannot be upheld under the 
Commerce Clause); id. at 657 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 11. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 12. NFIB, 567 U.S. at 560. 
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gives Congress broad authority to do things that are not definitionally 
authorized by the enumerated powers, so long as they are “conducive” 
or “plainly adapted” to the exercise of an enumerated power.  Indeed, 
less than a decade before NFIB, in Gonzales v. Raich,13 Justice Scalia 
made this very point:  pursuant to McCulloch, Congress can regulate 
things that are neither interstate nor commerce in order to make the 
regulation of an interstate market more effective.14  Scalia argued that 
criminalizing simple possession of marijuana was in that way a 
“necessary and proper” element of Congress’s nationwide prohibition 
of a market for marijuana.15  None of the other Justices bought into 
this analysis in Raich, and even Scalia refused to recognize his own 
argument seven years later in NFIB.16 
These puzzling facts point to a larger mystery at the heart of American 
federalism.  If McCulloch provides the definitive understanding of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, the application of its doctrine to the 
Commerce Clause should have produced a set of constitutional 
understandings dramatically different from those that were maintained 
by the Supreme Court for the first 150 years of the Republic, and those 
that in vestigial form re-emerged in NFIB.  An implied power, according 
to the prevailing understanding of McCulloch, is a power to regulate 
things that are not in themselves within the definition of an enumerated 
power, but whose regulation would be useful to implementing that 
enumerated power.17  The range of things that fall within the definition 
of a concept is akin to the logical entailments of that concept. It is much 
narrower than the range of things that support or sustain that concept 
in a practical way.  Implied powers partake of the latter relationship, 
                                               
 13. 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 14. Id. at 38–39 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 15. Id. at 34–35. 
 16. Id. at 33.  See generally NFIB, 567 U.S. at 646–47 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, 
JJ., dissenting) (failing to frame the Necessary and Proper Clause as an issue in the case). 
 17. A significant and growing literature argues that the federal government is 
recognized to have important powers that are neither enumerated nor means to carry 
out those that are.  See, e.g., Calvin H. Johnson, The Dubious Enumerated Power Doctrine, 
22 CONST. COMMENT. 25 (2006); John Mikhail, The Necessary and Proper Clauses, 102 
GEO. L.J. 1045 (2014); Richard Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, 124 YALE L.J. 576 
(2014) [hereinafter Primus, The Limits of Enumeration]; David S. Schwartz, A Question 
Perpetually Arising:  Implied Powers, Capable Federalism and the Limits of Enumerationism, 59 
ARIZ. L. REV. 573 (2017) [hereinafter Schwartz, A Question Perpetually Arising].  
Arguably, McCulloch is best read as supporting this idea.  See John Mikhail, McCulloch’s 
Strategic Ambiguity (forthcoming 2019) (on file with author).  That point, though 
important, is tangential to my argument here. 
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having the much broader and looser relatedness suggested by Marshall’s 
terminology (“conducive,” “convenient,” “plainly adapted”).18 
During the Antebellum Period, applying McCulloch to the 
Commerce Clause would have meant an implied power to build and 
regulate interstate roads and to regulate or even abolish slave labor.  In 
the post-Reconstruction era, implied commerce powers under 
McCulloch should have made clear that Congress had the power to 
regulate racially discriminatory intrastate economic transactions.  And 
in the Lochner/early New Deal period, an acknowledgement of implied 
commerce powers should have recognized Congress’s authority to 
regulate labor, manufacturing, mining, and agriculture.  Yet all these 
claims of power were highly contested by constitutional interpreters 
and were blocked by the Supreme Court before 1937. 
The Court’s stubborn refusal to apply McCulloch’s conception of 
implied powers to the Commerce Clause has largely escaped notice, 
and it arguably made a difference in the outcome of NFIB.  This Article 
argues that the Court’s refusal stems from two eighteenth and 
nineteenth century elements of American constitutional thought that 
were eliminated long ago.  One element was the inability of pre-
twentieth century judges to conceptualize a broad and workable theory 
of concurrent federal and state power.  To the nineteenth-century 
legal mind, most federal and state powers were to some degree, 
mutually exclusive.  In a commercial nation, in which most human 
activities eventually channeled into the stream of commerce, it seemed 
constitutionally necessary to many jurists to limit the Commerce Clause 
and implied powers—and especially to refrain from applying the 
concept of implied powers to the Commerce Clause—in order to 
preserve a substantial scope for state regulation. 
The other element was slavery.  The most salient factor limiting 
implied commerce powers in the Antebellum Period was the belief that 
states had to maintain control over the legality of slavery within their 
borders.  Because slavery was so obviously a commercial system that fed 
into interstate and international trade, a robust application of 
McCulloch’s doctrine of implied powers to the Commerce Clause would 
naturally lead to a congressional power to “interfere with” the institution 
of slavery within the states.  Mainstream constitutional interpreters 
viewed the implied limitation of such a power as an inescapable element 
of the constitutional bargain by antebellum judges and political 
                                               
 18. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415, 421–22 (1819). 
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leaders.19  Notwithstanding the Civil War and the Reconstruction 
amendments ending slavery and authorizing federal protection of 
freed slaves, the Court by the end of the nineteenth century, reverted 
to an implied limitation against federal control over race relations as it 
ratified southern states’ “home rule” and Jim Crow regimes.20 
These twin normative justifications for implied limitations on implied 
commerce powers fed into a robust doctrine of reserved state powers.  
Although mentioned in the Tenth Amendment, the idea of reserved 
sovereign powers of the states was itself an implication rather than an 
“enumeration” in our constitutional order, because its content is 
unspecified.  What powers are reserved to the states?  And what does 
“reserved” even mean in this context?  Nineteenth century jurisprudence 
developed the idea that the power to regulate a specific, identifiable set 
of things was reserved to the states, and those things were identifiable by 
their connection to slavery:  labor and the production of goods for trade 
(i.e., manufacturing, mining, and agriculture) made up the content of 
reserved powers.  The meaning of “reserved to the states” meant off 
limits to federal regulation, and in particular, immunity from federal 
implied commerce regulation. 
By the end of the 1960s, however, both of these twin supports of the 
implied limitation on implied commerce powers ceased to exist in 
American constitutional law.  Acceptance of concurrent, overlapping 
regulatory powers of federal and state governments, coordinated by 
preemption doctrine, had become the prevailing constitutional idea, 
as had a federal commerce power to regulate intrastate race relations. 
The idea that “reserved state powers” could defeat an assertion of 
implied commerce powers was definitively rejected, as expressed in the 
Court’s famous New Deal statement in United States v. Darby Lumber 
Co.21  There the Court said that the Tenth Amendment “states but a 
truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered.”22  Under 
this conception, reserved state powers consist of whatever is left after 
application of federal preemption doctrine.  Yet, the concept of 
reserved state powers as something capable of defeating claims of 
implied commerce powers has made a partial comeback.  The Lopez-
                                               
 19. See infra Part IV. 
 20. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551–52 (1896) (upholding racial 
segregation laws for public facilities under the separate but equal doctrine), overruled 
by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 21. 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
 22. Id. at 124. 
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Morrison-NFIB line of cases stands in tension with Darby’s “truism” 
principle by contending, in essence, that there must be some matters 
that the federal government cannot regulate, and thus, by implication, 
that there must be some content to the reserved powers of the states 
after all.  In reaching this conclusion, the Rehnquist and Roberts 
Courts’ conservatives claimed to rely on constitutional pedigree: “the 
principle that ‘[t]he Constitution created a Federal Government of 
limited powers,’ while reserving a generalized police power to the 
States, is deeply ingrained in our constitutional history.”23  Yet that 
history, as this Article argues, is not one with which the Court should 
want to claim a continuity.  It is a history built upon a conceptual error 
and a constitutional evil.  The conceptual error is the nineteenth 
century Court’s inability to conceive of a workable doctrine of 
concurrent power. The constitutional evil is the constitutional order’s 
accommodation with slavery, and later Jim Crow, by leaving individual 
states to decide for themselves how best to regulate race relations. 
Part I of this Article lays out the doctrinal puzzle.  While paying 
deference to the idea that McCulloch provides the authoritative 
statement of the implied powers of Congress, the Court nevertheless 
continues to decide cases as though McCulloch did not apply to the 
Commerce Clause.  Part II begins the historical inquiry into this puzzle.  
It shows how the standard federalism doctrines of limited enumerated 
powers and reserved state powers were historically connected to the 
constitutional error and evil:  the failure to conceptualize concurrent 
federal-state powers and the accommodation of slavery. 
Part III turns to the Marshall Court’s classic statements of 
congressional power, McCulloch and Gibbons v. Ogden.  This Part argues 
that these opinions themselves shied away from acknowledging 
implied commerce powers, largely because the error of concurrent 
powers and the evil of slavery accommodation shaped the Court’s 
thinking.  Part IV demonstrates that these jurisprudential concerns 
became more explicit in the Taney Court, which silently overruled 
McCulloch in order to resist federal commerce preemption and 
promote a vision of reserved state powers primarily intended to protect 
states’ rights to maintain slavery.  Part V carries the narrative from the 
Lochner era to the present.  While the New Deal Court briefly embraced 
the idea of implied commerce powers, its more recent jurisprudence 
has partially revived the notion that implied commerce powers can be 
                                               
 23. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 n.8 (2000) (alteration in original). 
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defeated by an inchoate version of reserved state powers, in the form of 
a rule that there “must be something” that Congress cannot regulate. 
This Article makes an important distinction in terminology by using 
the term “Commerce Clause” to refer to the language of the enumerated 
power to regulate commerce, while using the term “commerce power” 
to refer more broadly to express and implied commerce powers:  
whatever Congress can regulate under the Commerce Clause, 
including those implied powers that are “conducive” or “plainly 
adapted” to regulating commerce.  Though the terms “Commerce 
Clause” and “commerce power” are normally used interchangeably in 
constitutional discourse, this is part of the problem:  a tendency to 
gloss over the notion of powers implied under the Commerce Clause. 
I.    THE LIMITS OF IMPLIED COMMERCE POWERS 
A.   A Doctrinal Puzzle 
In 2012, in NFIB, the Supreme Court came within a hair’s breadth of 
striking down the Affordable Care Act, the most sweeping national 
health care legislation in nearly fifty years, and the painstakingly 
negotiated product of decades of often futile legislative effort.24  The five 
conservative Justices concluded that Congress’s commerce power does 
not include the power to regulate economic “inactivity” and, therefore, 
Congress lacked authority to mandate individuals purchase health 
insurance.25  This health insurance purchase “individual mandate,” 
widely recognized as the keystone to the entire statute, survived this 
constitutional challenge only because Chief Justice Roberts decided that 
it could be upheld as a tax, under Congress’s taxing power.26 
                                               
 24. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, Obama Signs Health Care Overhaul Bill, with 
a Flourish, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/ 
health/policy/24health.html; A History of Overhauling Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, 
https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2009/07/19/us/politics
/20090717_HEALTH_TIMELINE.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2019). 
 25. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 556–67 (2012) 
(permitting Congress to anticipate future activity just to regulate it is not supported by 
Commerce Clause precedent); see also id. at 658 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., 
dissenting) (allowing Congress to regulate inactivity as commerce is to recognize an 
unlimited commerce power). 
 26. Id. at 588.  The distinction is far from academic.  Just as the taxing power 
rationale gave supporters of the law a second bite at the apple of constitutionality before 
the Court in 2012, it gave a Republican-controlled Congress a second bite at repealing 
this provision in 2017.  See Juliet Eilperin & Carolyn Y. Johnson, What’s Next for the 
Affordable Care Act Now that Repeal has Failed?, WASH. POST. (July 28, 2017), 
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Why couldn’t Congress regulate a particular form of “economic 
inactivity” that was essential to its broad regulation of the health care 
market?  The answer can’t be simply what the conservative Justices told 
us:  that “inactivity” is not “commerce.”27  After all, the concept of 
implied powers, established in McCulloch, tells us that Congress may 
assert a power not expressly granted—here, regulation of “inactivity”—
that is convenient, plainly adapted, conducive, etc., to executing its 
enumerated powers (here, regulation of interstate commerce).28  
Simply holding that “inactivity” is not “commerce” merely tells us that 
regulating inactivity is not an exercise of the express power of 
regulating commerce.  But implied powers do not depend on 
definitions of express powers.  Rather, they flow from the practical 
relationship between the regulatory object and the express power. 
Ironically, Justice Scalia made this very point a few years before NFIB, 
in his concurrence in Gonzales v. Raich.29  The federal Controlled 
Substances Act30 criminalizes, among many other things, the simple 
possession of marijuana.31  If that is an “economic activity” at all, Scalia 
observed, it is certainly not an interstate one.  Nor, as Scalia implied, 
was the home growing of a few marijuana plants for personal 
consumption.32  Yet, the federal act could outlaw these things because: 
[W]here Congress has the authority to enact a regulation of 
interstate commerce, “it possesses every power needed to make that 
regulation effective.”  Although this power “to make . . . regulation 
effective” commonly overlaps with the authority to regulate 
economic activities that substantially affect interstate commerce, 
and may in some cases have been confused with that authority, the 
two are distinct.  The regulation of an intrastate activity may be 
essential to a comprehensive regulation of interstate commerce even 
though the intrastate activity does not itself “substantially affect” 
interstate commerce.  Moreover, as [Lopez] suggests, Congress may 
regulate even noneconomic local activity if that regulation is a 
                                               
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/whats-next-for-the-affordab 
le-care-act-now-that-repeal-has-failed/2017/07/28/e209c7ce-70b5-11e7-9eac-d56bd556 
8db8_story. 
 27. NFIB, 567 U.S. at 658 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) 
(explaining that “inactivity” cannot be regulated under the Commerce Clause because 
“[i]f all inactivity affecting commerce is commerce, commerce is everything”). 
 28. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 418, 421 (1819). 
 29. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 38 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 30. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971 (2012). 
 31. Id. § 844(a), (c). 
 32. Raich, 545 U.S. at 40 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
2019] AN ERROR AND AN EVIL 937 
 
necessary part of a more general regulation of interstate commerce.  
The relevant question is simply whether the means chosen are 
“reasonably adapted” to the attainment of a legitimate end under 
the commerce power . . . .33 
[T]he Necessary and Proper Clause . . . empowers Congress to enact 
laws in effectuation of its enumerated powers that are not within its 
authority to enact in isolation.  See McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 
316, 421–22 (1819).34 
In sum, Congress could outlaw simple possession, home growing, and 
consumption of marijuana not because they were “economic activities,” 
and therefore within the definition of commerce—note that Scalia would 
ridicule the idea that consumption of broccoli was “economic activity” in 
the NFIB case.35  Rather, these things fell within Congress’s implied 
commerce powers under McCulloch because their prohibition was plainly 
adapted to the regulation of an interstate black market in marijuana. 
Chief Justice Roberts and the NFIB joint dissenters recognized the 
practical necessity of the individual mandate to regulating the markets 
for health care services; indeed, the joint dissenters argued that the 
entire statute must be struck down because it could not work without 
the individual mandate.36  The joint dissenters, including Scalia himself, 
simply ignored Scalia’s point in Raich.  Roberts, for his part, tried to 
finesse this point by arguing, circularly, that however “necessary” the 
individual mandate was, it was not “proper” because it was not within the 
definition of commerce!  Roberts argued, “[t]he individual mandate . . . 
vests Congress with the extraordinary ability to create the necessary 
predicate to the exercise of an enumerated power.”37  That is to say, the 
mandate impermissibly requires a purchase of health insurance in order 
to regulate it, as Roberts saw it.  But the market for health services and 
insurance is undoubtedly commerce, and for Roberts to say that 
commercial activity is a “necessary predicate” for commerce power 
regulation is to limit commerce regulation to its definition and exclude 
implied powers.  The five-Justice majority essentially argued that the 
definition of commerce, despite its breadth, is not broad enough to reach 
                                               
 33. Id. at 36–37. 
 34. Id. at 39. 
 35. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 660 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, 
Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting); Transcript of Oral Argument at 13–14, id. at 519, (No. 11-
398) (quoting Justice Scalia’s quip “therefore, you can make people buy broccoli”). 
 36. NFIB, 567 U.S. at 691 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 37. Id. 
938 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:927 
 
inactivity.38  The concept of implied commerce powers was given short 
shrift—or entirely ignored.  The implication is that, perhaps because of 
its breadth, the Commerce Clause must be interpreted as though implied 
powers did not flow from it. 
Thus, five Justices agreed that the doctrine of implied powers should 
not be applied to the Commerce Clause in NFIB.  And in Raich, eight 
Justices ignored McCulloch, appearing to believe that the concept of 
implied commerce powers was irrelevant to their analysis. 
It is easy to argue that the Commerce Clause is in some senses 
unique among the enumerated powers.  It is now, hands down, the 
broadest regulatory power Congress has, and it has undoubtedly 
undergone the most transformative expansion in how our 
constitutional order interprets it.  These features of the Commerce 
Clause are well known.  What has flown beneath the radar is a kind of 
“Commerce Clause exceptionalism” with respect to McCulloch and 
implied powers.  Those who fail or refuse to acknowledge implied 
commerce powers, such as the Justices in cases like Raich and NFIB, 
don’t explain their failure.   
B.   The Return of Reserved State Powers 
According to the Tenth Amendment, the reserved powers of the 
states are those powers “not delegated to the United States.” Well-
established constitutional doctrine holds that the “delegat[ion] to the 
United States” includes both enumerated and implied powers.  
“Reserved to the states” implies powers that are withheld from the 
United States.  In an important sense, then, reserved state powers 
negatively express the limits on delegated, and particularly on implied, 
federal powers.  As will be seen, the most historically important 
application of the concept of reserved state powers for more than a 
century was to impose implied limits on implied commerce powers. 
Modern doctrine holds that the Tenth Amendment “states but a 
truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered.”39 This 
important statement means that reserved state powers do not have 
definite content, but rather represent an equation that states retain a 
residuum of powers determined to be “not delegated” to the United 
States.  Given that implied powers are not a fixed quantum or fixed 
target, but arise due to circumstantial adaptations to regulatory 
                                               
 38. See, e.g., id. at 658. 
 39. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). 
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problems, reserved state powers also cannot be fixed as a pre-defined set 
of powers.  Darby’s “truism” principle also means that reserved state 
powers cannot act as a logically independent limit on implied powers.  
Whether a claimed federal regulatory power can be implied depends on 
its being “necessary and proper” to executing an enumerated power, not 
on its avoidance of infringement on a purportedly reserved state power. 
While claiming to adhere to Darby’s truism principle, the Rehnquist and 
Roberts Courts have walked it back somewhat.  In Lopez and Morrison, the 
Court rejected assertions of federal commerce power largely on the 
contention that “the Constitution’s enumeration of powers” requires the 
Court to “presuppose[] something not enumerated”—something 
consisting of the reserved powers of the states.40  This strikingly context-
distorting quotation from Gibbons v. Ogden41 assumes a constitutional 
theory in which “there must be something” that Congress cannot 
regulate.42  That something emerges only from time to time and 
circumstantially, but to the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, its existence is 
needed to prove the limiting effect of the enumerated powers.43 
Rather than acknowledging that “reserved state powers” are merely 
a truism, Lopez regresses to the premise that the reserved state powers 
have content.  To be sure, that content is a sort of constitutional dark 
matter that is known to exist without being clearly identified.  Richard 
Primus has referred to this premise as “the internal-limits canon,” the 
idea that the federal government is denied a general police power.44  
Rather than relying on Primus’s label, which gives the doctrine more 
of an air of dignity than it deserves, this Article refers to it as the 
“mustbesomething” rule. 
                                               
 40. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615, 616 n.7 (2000); United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824)). 
 41. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
 42. Id. at 195.  As Richard Primus explains, the quotation referred only to the 
enumeration in the Commerce Clause itself, not to the entirety of the Constitution’s 
enumerated powers.  Moreover, Chief Justice Marshall’s point was not to stress limits 
on federal power, but to indicate that the delegation of a federal commerce power did 
not entirely wipe out the states’ power to regulate their “purely internal” commerce.  
Richard Primus, The Gibbons Fallacy, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 567, 586–87, 615 (2017). 
 43. Schwartz, A Question Perpetually Arising, supra note 17, at 587–90. 
 44. Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, supra note 17, at 578; see also Andrew Coan, 
Implementing Enumeration, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1985, 1988 (2016). 
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II.    RECAPTURING NINETEENTH CENTURY FEDERALISM 
The reluctance to apply McCulloch’s doctrine of implied powers to the 
Commerce Clause did not crop up for the first time in the Rehnquist or 
Roberts Courts.  Indeed, it is traceable to the Marshall Court, which itself 
went to some lengths to avoid embracing implied commerce powers—
even in McCulloch.  To see this, however, requires taking a detailed look 
at the historical context for antebellum constitutional opinions.  The 
context involves the interaction of constitutional law and constitutional 
politics.  The latter are primarily the debates over policies that tend to 
reflect the more fundamental differences over the nature of 
government and to settle into political party differences, though they 
are typically framed as arguments over constitutional principles.45  But it 
need hardly be said that constitutional law and politics heavily influence 
one another, and that the two tend to converge around the articulation 
of constitutional principles. 
A. Constitutional Law 
The antebellum Supreme Court was repeatedly faced with two 
federalism questions:  How extensive were the powers delegated to the 
national government, and what were the implications for state 
regulatory authority in fields overlapping with these delegations?  
These questions gave rise to two doctrinal problems:  implied powers 
and concurrent powers.  Implied powers created an interpretive fog 
around the edges of the enumerated powers, making their extent 
uncertain.  “Concurrent powers” is my shorthand for the complex 
question:  Does the Constitution’s delegation of power to the federal 
government, or the exercise of a delegated power by legislation, 
preclude state legislation over the same objects?  These two intertwined 
problems potentially arise with regard to any enumerated power, but 
they were particularly vexing in connection the Commerce Clause, that 
broadest of enumerated legislative powers.  The problems were never 
satisfactorily solved by nineteenth century jurists. 
1. Separate spheres:  exclusive versus concurrent powers 
The Antifederalists, who opposed ratification of the Constitution, 
and later the Jeffersonian Republicans, who dominated politics in the 
two decades following Jefferson’s election to the presidency in 1800, 
                                               
 45. 1 HOWARD GILLMAN ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM:  STRUCTURES OF 
GOVERNMENT xxii (2d ed. 2013). 
2019] AN ERROR AND AN EVIL 941 
 
frequently expressed anxiety about expansive federal power leading 
inexorably to a “consolidated government.”46  By this, they meant a 
national government that exercised all legislative power.  Modern 
constitutional scholars tend to understand this fear partially and 
ahistorically by viewing it through the prism of laissez faire and 
libertarian ideologies that emerged at the end of the nineteenth 
century.47  Viewed that way, the fears of consolidated government 
should present a puzzle because federal regulation was comparatively 
sparse for much of the nineteenth century.  The answer to this puzzle 
requires recognizing that resistance to expansive interpretations of 
federal power was motivated in large part, not by opposition to 
regulation as such, but the opposite. 
Many constitutional interpreters feared that grants of power to the 
general government would be construed as exclusive, and thereby 
eliminate wide swaths of municipal laws governing health, safety, and 
commercial life.48  As legal historian William Novak has shown, 
antebellum America was not characterized by laissez faire.49  
Notwithstanding the sparseness of federal regulation, American life 
was subject to dense regulatory regimes at the state and particularly the 
local level.  Antebellum judges were concerned to maintain a “well-
regulated society,” characterized by dense networks of laws promoting 
the general welfare and regulating property and conduct.50  These laws 
came to be known under the heading of state “police power” or 
“municipal legislation.”51  Many judges were deeply concerned by 
arguments that various constitutional grants of federal power excluded 
states from exercising similar powers, even in its “dormant” state”—
that is, even in the absence of federal legislation.52 
                                               
 46. See, e.g., GERALD GUNTHER, JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. 
MARYLAND 141 (1969). 
 47. See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED:  THE RISE AND DEMISE OF 
LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 10, 20–21 (1993) (emphasizing 
connections between Jacksonian and later laissez-faire jurisprudence); see also William 
J. Novak, The Myth of the “Weak” American State, 113 AM. HIST. REV. 752, 753 (2008) 
(noting that in the nineteenth century, state legislatures were already heavily 
regulating the economy). 
 48. Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, supra note 17, at 595. 
 49. Novak, supra note 47, at 753. 
 50. WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE:  LAW AND REGULATION IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 16–17 (1996). 
 51. Id. at 16; New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 139 (1837). 
 52. See, e.g., Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 252 (1829). 
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The Commerce Clause created the deepest concern.  In 1812, the 
New York Court for the Correction of Errors decided Livingston v. Van 
Ingen,53 a federal dormant commerce challenge to the Livingston-
Fulton steamboat monopoly on the Hudson River that would be 
invalidated a decade later by the Supreme Court in Gibbons.  The court 
upheld the monopoly, and the lead opinion by James Kent explained 
the rejection of dormant Commerce Clause exclusivity in these terms: 
Our turnpike roads, our toll-bridges, the exclusive grant to run stage 
waggons [sic], our laws relating to paupers from other states, our 
Sunday laws, our rights of ferriage over navigable rivers and lakes, 
our auction licenses, our licenses to retail spirituous liquors, the laws 
to restrain hawkers and pedlars [sic]; what are all these provisions 
but regulations of internal commerce, affecting as well the 
intercourse between the citizens of this and other states, as between 
our own citizens?  So we also exercise, to a considerable degree, a 
concurrent power with congress in the regulation of external 
commerce.  What are our inspection laws relative to the staple 
commodities of this state, which prohibit the exportation, except 
upon certain conditions, of flour, of salt provisions, of certain 
articles of lumber, and of pot and pearl ashes, but regulations of 
external commerce?  Our health and quarantine laws, and the laws 
prohibiting the importation of slaves are striking examples of the 
same kind.  So the act relative to the poor, which requires all masters 
of vessels coming from abroad to report and give security to the mayor 
of New York, that the passengers, being aliens, shall not become 
chargeable as paupers, and in case of default, making even the ship or 
vessel from which the alien shall be landed liable to seizure, is another 
and very important regulation affecting foreign commerce. 
Are we prepared to say, in the face of all these regulations, which form 
such a mass of evidence of the uniform construction of our powers, 
that a special privilege for the exclusive navigation by a steam-boat 
upon our waters, is void, because it may, by possibility, and in the 
course of events, interfere with the power granted to congress to 
regulate commerce?  Nothing, in my opinion, would be more 
preposterous and extravagant.  Which of our existing regulations may 
not equally interfere with the power of congress?54 
 More than a generation later, judicial doctrine had still not alleviated 
these fears.  Justice Catron’s concurring opinion in The License Cases55 is 
illustrative.  To hold the federal commerce power to be exclusive, he 
                                               
 53. 9 Johns. 507 (N.Y. 1812). 
 54. Id. at 580. 
 55. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847). 
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warned, “would overthrow and annul entire codes of State legislation” 
and “expunge more State laws and city corporate regulations than 
Congress is likely to make in a century on the same subject.”56 
These fears might seem odd, since modern constitutional lawyers so 
easily accept the idea that the federal and state governments exercise 
concurrent powers.  Coordination of overlapping federal and state 
jurisdiction is handled through preemption doctrine, which generally 
tolerates the simultaneous pursuit of non-conflicting policies by the 
two levels of government. To be sure, antebellum constitutionalists 
understood the potential for conflict between federal and state laws—
hence, the Supremacy Clause—but this understanding entailed laws 
having regulatory effects on the same subject but coming from 
different sources of power.  Kent articulated something close to the 
modern view of concurrent federal and state powers in 1812 in 
Livingston.  “It does not follow,” he wrote, “that because a given power 
is granted to congress, the states cannot exercise a similar power.”57  
Unless denied powers by the U.S. Constitution in express terms, or by 
“necessary implication,” states “may then go on in the exercise of the 
power until it comes practically in collision with the actual exercise of 
some congressional power.”58  In such a case, “the state authority will 
so far be controlled, but it will still be good in all those respects in 
which it does not absolutely contravene the provision of the 
paramount law.”59  But Kent was virtually alone in articulating this 
concept, and was 100 years ahead of his time.  Far more typical was the 
view expressed by Justice Bushrod Washington, announcing the 
judgment of the Marshall Court in Houston v. Moore:60  “I am altogether 
incapable of comprehending how two distinct wills can, at the same 
time, be exercised in relation to the same subject, to be effectual, and 
at the same time compatible with each other.”61 
Washington’s constitutional mind-set, conceiving federal and state 
power as separate and non-overlapping spheres, can be seen in the 
nation’s founding documents.  The Tenth Amendment seems to 
assume this view in providing that “[t]he powers . . . reserved to the 
States” are those “not delegated to the United States by the 
                                               
 56. Id. at 607 (Catron, J., concurring). 
 57. Livingston, 9 Johns. at 574 (Kent, J.). 
 58. Id. at 576. 
 59. Id. 
 60. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820). 
 61. Id. at 23. 
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Constitution.”  Similarly, the Articles of Confederation declared that 
“[e]ach state retains . . . every power, jurisdiction and right, which is 
not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in 
Congress assembled.”62  The implication that states “surrendered” 
powers that were delegated (or expressly delegated) to the national 
government was articulated with some frequency by constitutional 
lawyers and judges.63  If a grant of power to the general government is 
a surrender of that power formerly held by the states, then it would be 
difficult to conceive how both governments could exercise it. Thus, 
nineteenth century constitutionalists widely believed that federal and 
state legislative powers were confined to “separate spheres” that were 
mutually exclusive.64  The Constitution’s grant of a power to the federal 
government created a strong presumption that states were precluded 
from exercising that same power concurrently. 
This view of things meant that expansive interpretations of federal 
power could prove highly disruptive to the well-ordered society by 
replacing the dense fabric of state and local laws with sparse federal 
legislation or “dormant power.”  Keeping federal powers “few and 
defined” would, in a world of mutual exclusivity, be essential to 
preserving state authority to regulate. 
The separate spheres concept was fraught with disagreement and 
conceptual confusion about the nature of exclusive and concurrent 
powers.  The starting point for antebellum judges was typically 
Hamilton’s Federalist No. 32, which states the federal power can be 
exclusive in three circumstances:  an express excusive grant to Congress 
(e.g., governing the federal capital district), an express prohibition 
against the states (e.g., coining money) or a grant to Congress of a power 
                                               
 62. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1777, art. II. 
 63. See, e.g., Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 452 (1827) (Thompson, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he power of Congress to regulate commerce . . . was a power possessed 
by the States respectively before the adoption of the constitution, and . . . is to be viewed, 
therefore, as the surrender of a power antecedently possessed by the States.”); Martin v. 
Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 325 (1816) (“[T]he sovereign powers vested in 
the state governments, by their respective constitutions, remained unaltered and 
unimpaired, except so far as they were granted to the government of the United States.”); 
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 435 (1793) (“[T]he United States have no claim 
to any authority but such as the States have surrendered to them.”). 
 64. See, e.g., South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448 (1905) (“We have in 
this Republic, a dual system of government, National and state, each operating within 
the same territory and upon the same persons; and yet working without collision, because 
their functions are different.”); Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. 
L. REV. 1, 4 (1950) (defining “dual federalism” in terms of separate spheres). 
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whose nature was not divisible between dual sovereigns.65  But this 
explanation provided little real guidance, since the difficult cases all fall 
into the third category, and Hamilton begs the imponderable question 
of how to identify “indivisible” grants of power. 
A further problem with the separate spheres concept was whether a 
federal grant of power, if exclusive, would be exclusive in its negative or 
dormant state—that is, by virtue of the grant per se, even in the absence 
of federal legislation.  The Marshall Court struggled inconclusively with 
this issue.  In Sturges v. Crowninshield,66 decided two weeks before 
McCulloch, the Court unanimously rejected the claim that New York’s 
bankruptcy law was barred by a dormant bankruptcy power.67  While 
state bankruptcy laws might be “perhaps[] incompatible” with a uniform 
federal bankruptcy law, Congress had not yet enacted any such law, the 
Court ambiguously decided.68  But other enumerated powers might still 
be exclusive in their dormant state. 
The preclusive effect of federal legislation was also uncertain.  
Antebellum judges frequently spoke of “collision” and “conflict” 
between particular federal and state statutes.  In such cases, the courts 
recognized, the Supremacy Clause meant that federal law would win the 
conflict.69  But it was more often than not unclear whether the conflict 
arose from incompatible policies between the two laws or, instead, from 
a view that once Congress regulated, then any state law in the same 
regulatory space created a collision.  In other words, antebellum Justices 
had not yet worked out the modern distinction between what we now 
call “conflict preemption” and “field preemption.”70 
Lacking a conflict/field preemption distinction, antebellum judges 
did not necessarily conceive of “concurrent” powers the way we do 
today.  Modern doctrine recognizes that states have the power to 
regulate interstate commerce in a non-discriminatory manner that 
                                               
 65. THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 199 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961); see, e.g., Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 318 (1851); Livingston 
v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507, 576 (N.Y. 1812). 
 66. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819). 
 67. Id. at 196–97. 
 68. Id. at 194. 
 69. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 210 (1824). 
 70. See Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 
801 (1994) (explaining that because there was so little federal legislation in the 
nineteenth century the initial cases of preemption norm arose after 1912); see also 
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 401–03 (3d ed. 
2006) (explaining conflict and field preemption). 
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does not conflict with federal law or enter a field exclusively occupied 
by a federal statute.71  Antebellum judges typically assumed that states 
had no power to regulate interstate commerce as such, but could 
effectively do so indirectly, by exercising so-called “police powers”—
that is, by purporting to regulate health, safety, or morals.72  In other 
words, nineteenth century “concurrent powers” could be recognized 
only insofar as the federal and state powers were deemed to come from 
different sources (police rather than commerce power) or to have 
different regulatory objectives (health or safety rather than trade). 
The problem of exclusivity was further complicated by the concept 
of implied powers.  Federal legislation under implied powers would 
broaden the potential of federal power to nullify state law under a 
conflict preemption approach.  But for jurists who adopted a proto-
field-preemption understanding of federal exclusivity, the implied 
powers would have the potential to extend federal exclusivity—not 
mere conflict preemption—far beyond the four corners of the 
enumerated powers.73  For example, under a proto-field preemption 
approach, an implied power to create a national bank would occupy 
the field of banking and exclude states’ power to charter banks. 
2.  The problem of implied powers 
An axiom of American constitutionalism holds that the government 
of the United States is one of limited powers.  Expressing the 
conventional view, Chief Justice Roberts wrote in 2012 that “rather 
than granting general authority to perform all the conceivable 
functions of government, the Constitution lists, or enumerates, the 
Federal Government’s powers . . .  The Constitution’s express 
conferral of some powers makes clear that it does not grant others.”74  
But that begs an important question:  is the federal government strictly 
limited to those enumerated powers? 
Despite its axiomatic quality, the idea of limited enumerated powers 
is highly problematic because it is difficult to implement and debatable 
as a matter of original intent.75  Any enumeration or list of terms set 
out in a legal instrument—whether it be a statute, contract, will, 
                                               
 71. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 70, at 401–12. 
 72. See, e.g., Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 208; New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 
102, 132 (1837); see infra Part IV. 
 73. See Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507, 576 (N.Y. 1812); see also Gibbons, 22 
U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 47. 
 74. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 534 (2012). 
 75. See Schwartz, A Question Perpetually Arising, supra note 17, at 590–608. 
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corporate charter, or constitution—presents the interpretive question 
whether the list is meant to be exhaustive or illustrative.  To interpret 
the list as exhaustive means to exclude what is not listed.  This 
approach is captured by the interpretive canon expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius: “the expression of one [thing] is the exclusion of 
other[s].”76  Some, but not all, lists or enumerations are meant to be 
interpreted this way.  However, an opposing approach asks interpreters 
to imply the inclusion of items “of the same nature”—ejusdem generis, 
in the pertinent legal Latin phrase.77  Contrary to the conventional 
view, the Constitution does not specify whether its enumeration of 
powers is meant to be exhaustive or illustrative.78 
The Constitution’s particular enumeration of powers defies a 
consistent application of the expressio unius principle.  For example, 
Article I, section 8, and Article III, section 3, clause 2 authorize Congress 
to create criminal punishments for counterfeiting, piracy, and treason, 
respectively.  Rigorous application of expressio unius should lead to the 
conclusion that Congress has no power to impose other criminal 
punishments.  The enumerated power to create post offices would 
likewise imply that Congress cannot create other administrative 
departments or agencies.  The enumerated power to call out the militia 
to “repel invasions” would suggest that the regular army could not be 
employed for that purpose.  These results are absurd, of course, and 
doubtless not how the Constitution was meant to be interpreted; but that 
tends to undermine the exclusivity principle of enumerated powers.79 
The exclusivity principle is likewise flouted by interpreting 
enumerated powers to imply similar powers of like magnitude or 
greater.  Examples of this include implying a power to issue paper 
money from the enumerated power to coin money,80  and implying a 
power to deport aliens from the enumerated power to “naturalize” 
foreigners into American citizenship.81  These long-accepted national 
powers do not fit the model of limited enumerated powers.82 
                                               
 76. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., ET AL., STATUTES, REGULATION, AND INTERPRETATION:  
LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF STATUTES 1091 (2014). 
 77. Id. at 455. 
 78. See id. at 590–91. 
 79. Id. at 600–03. 
 80. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5. 
 81. Id. cl. 4. 
 82. Schwartz, A Question Perpetually Arising, supra note 17, at 621–24 (listing the many 
unenumerated powers that have commonly been accepted as legitimate implied powers). 
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Constitutional history has muddied the waters on these questions.  
Many political leaders in the early Republic couched their 
constitutional arguments in terms of limited enumerated powers, 
either because their political agenda entailed limiting federal power 
or because they wished to sell a nationalist agenda to their stricter 
constructionist colleagues.  After Jefferson’s election in 1800, 
professions of limited enumerated powers were even more apt to 
predominate, and assertions of nationalism tended to be more 
encoded in those terms.83  Yet the nation continued to work around 
the limits of rigorous enumerated powers doctrine from time to time, 
when the enumerated powers proved inconveniently narrow.  As late 
as 1817, Jefferson recognized that the original public meaning of the 
Constitution’s enumeration was contested. The tenet that Congress 
has only the power to provide for enumerated powers, and not for the 
general welfare “is almost the only landmark which now divides the 
federalists from the republicans.”84 
Further complicating the enumerated powers model is the problem 
of implied powers.  An implied power is qualitatively different from an 
enumerated power.  For example, there is no enumerated power to 
create courts outside of Article III, but courts martial are conducive or 
“plainly adapted” to enforcing the “Rules for the Government and 
Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”85  An implied power serves 
an enumerated power by authorizing legislative means that are not 
logically entailed in the enumerated power, and extends to subject 
matter that falls outside the definition of an enumerated power.86  
Thus, implied powers can reach unenumerated regulatory objects. 
In a logical sense, implied powers are a virtually unavoidable feature 
of a written Constitution.87  This unavoidability can be readily seen by 
                                               
 83. 2 DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS:  THE JEFFERSONIANS, 1801–
1829 120–22, 258–78 (2001) [hereinafter CURRIE, THE JEFFERSONIANS]. 
 84. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin (June 16, 1817), in 12 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 71 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1961). 
 85. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14; see An Act for the Government of the Navy of the 
United States, 1 Stat. 709–10 (1799) (creating courts martial); 1 DAVID P. CURRIE, THE 
CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS:  THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789–1801 243 n.40 (1997) 
[hereinafter CURRIE, FEDERALIST PERIOD] (noting absence of constitutional objections 
to creating courts martial). 
 86. See Schwartz, A Question Perpetually Arising, supra note 17, at 609–11; cf. 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 409–11 (1819). 
 87. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407–10; Alexander Hamilton, Final Version 
of An Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a National Bank, in 8 THE PAPERS 
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trying to envision how the granted legislative powers could be executed 
without them.  A tax on whiskey might be said to be a specific example, 
and thus a direct exercise, of the enumerated taxing power.  But not 
all legislation can be so obviously a specific instance of the general 
category described as an enumerated power.  Far from it.  Once we 
move into the details of implementation, implied powers questions 
quickly emerge.  How is the whiskey tax to be collected?  The hiring of 
federal tax collectors may well be implicit in the power to “collect” 
taxes, but it is not simply a specific example of tax collection—it is 
easier and more logical to conceive it as an implied power than to 
characterize it as a direct implementation of the taxing power. 
The logical necessity of implied powers was understood from the 
beginning of the Republic.  Hamilton recognized this fact.88  So did 
the Marshall Court in a now-obscure 1805 decision, United States v. 
Fisher.89  The existence of implied powers was thus well established by 
the time Marshall explained in McCulloch that “[a] constitution, to 
contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its great 
powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried 
into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code . . . .”90  
Therefore, while its “great outlines” and “important objects” will be 
stated expressly, the means to implement them must be “deduced.”91  
Denying the existence of implied powers makes legislative 
implementation unduly difficult, if not logically impossible, as 
legislators and courts would become hopelessly bogged down in arid 
debates over whether, for example, the hiring of a tax collector was 
“directly” authorized by the taxing power. 
Thus, even strict Jeffersonian enumerationists acknowledged the 
existence of implied powers.92  But the existence of implied powers 
creates challenging interpretive and analytical problems when applied 
to the framework of limited enumerated powers.  Since implied powers 
are by definition not enumerated, it becomes necessary to distinguish 
between permissible and impermissible implied powers:  distinguishing 
                                               
OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 97–98 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1965) 
[hereinafter Opinion on Constitutionality]. 
 88. Hamilton, Opinion on Constitutionality, supra note 87, at 8–9. 
 89. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358 (1805). 
 90. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See id. at 409 (“It is not denied, that the powers given to the government imply 
the ordinary means of execution.”). 
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those that somehow do not disrupt the purportedly exclusive nature of 
the enumerated powers from those that do. 
The Antifederalist wing of the Jeffersonian party argued that express 
legislative powers could be implemented by only those laws strictly 
necessary to exercising the express grant.  They defined strict necessity 
as that without which the express power would be nugatory.93  Aside 
from the rejection of this argument in McCulloch,94 we can see that the 
argument tends to collapse in on itself logically.  A tax on whiskey 
might be a direct implementation of the taxing power, and one could 
say the power to impose an excise on a commodity is strictly necessary 
for the exercise of the taxing power.  But a power to tax whiskey is not 
strictly necessary because the taxing power could be exercised by 
taxing carriages or by customs duties.95  Thus, the “strict necessity” test 
for implied powers creates a paradox.  As Marshall recognized in Fisher, 
“Where various systems might be adopted for [a legislative] purpose, it 
might be said with respect to each, that it was not necessary because 
the end might be obtained by other means.”96 
The First and Second Banks of the United States themselves were stark 
reminders of the implied powers problem.  Although private, the Banks 
were exemplars of a large federal administrative agency, sending branches 
into all of the states and making their impact felt broadly and deeply 
throughout U.S. economic life.97  Despite McCulloch, the constitutionality 
of such an institution was never truly settled in the form of a broad 
national consensus.98  Opposition to the re-charter of a national bank 
persisted until the issue fell off the national agenda, after Civil War 
financing demonstrated that such an institution could be done 
without.99  To advocates of strict construction and states’ rights, if an 
institution such as the Bank could be implied as a power of Congress, 
it would be hard to discern the limits of implied powers.100 
                                               
 93. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 94. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 413–14. 
 95. Schwartz, A Question Perpetually Arising, supra note 17, at 610. 
 96. United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 396 (1805). 
 97. See generally McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 424; EDWARD S. KAPLAN, THE BANK 
OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 57 (1999). 
 98. David S. Schwartz, Misreading McCulloch v. Maryland, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 
15 (2015) [hereinafter Schwartz, Misreading McCulloch]. 
 99. See KAPLAN, supra note 97, at 134, 143 (noting that in April 1834, the House of 
Representatives voted against rechartering the Bank, sealing its fate). 
 100. See, e.g., James Madison, Speech to the House of Representatives in Opposition to the 
Bank Bill, in 13 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 375–76 (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 
1981) (“If Congress could incorporate a Bank, . . . Congress might even establish 
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3. The Commerce Clause 
Article I, section 8, clause 3 of the Constitution empowers Congress 
“To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several 
States, and with the Indian Tribes.”101  These sixteen words, known as 
“the Commerce Clause,” form what has become the Constitution’s 
broadest grant of regulatory power to the federal government.  With 
few exceptions, a general antebellum consensus acknowledged that 
Congress should have plenary power to regulate relations, commercial 
and otherwise, with foreign governments. But sharp controversies 
arose over the breadth of Congress’s power to regulate commerce 
“among the several states”—interstate commerce. 
Today, well-established Supreme Court doctrine construes the 
power to regulate interstate commerce as an authorization for 
Congress to regulate all economic activity having a significant 
aggregate effect on the interstate economy.102  In 1819, however, the 
scope of the Commerce Clause was uncertain, and considerably 
narrower.  Many interpreters of the Constitution deemed “interstate 
commerce” as restricted to actual buying-and-selling transactions that 
crossed state lines.103  It was widely agreed that the commerce power 
included a federal power to regulate navigation, but it was not certain 
whether this was an implied power or instead fell within the definition 
of commerce itself.104  Either way, commerce was defined so narrowly 
as to exclude categories of economic activities such as manufacturing 
and agriculture:  even if the activities in question required purchases 
of tools and supplies that moved interstate, and produced goods for 
interstate markets, they were typically viewed as taking place in 
between buying and selling transactions, and therefore not in 
                                               
religious teachers in every parish, and pay them out of the Treasury of the United 
States.”); see also Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bill for 
Establishing a National Bank, in THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 276 (Julian P. Boyd & 
Ruth W. Lester eds., 1974) (“To take a single step beyond the boundaries thus specially 
drawn around the powers of Congress, is to take possession of a boundless field of 
power, no longer susceptible of any definition.”). 
 101. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 102. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559–60 (1995) (explaining 
substantial effects test). 
 103. See, e.g., Howard Gillman, More on the Origins of the Fuller Court’s Jurisprudence:  
Reexamining the Scope of Federal Power over Commerce and Manufacturing in Nineteenth-
Century Constitutional Law, 49 POL. RES. Q. 415, 423–24 (1996). 
 104. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 209 (1824) (holding that Congress’ 
power to regulate interstate commerce encompasses the power to regulate navigation). 
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themselves commerce.105  Strict constructionists went so far as to argue 
that even interstate and international transportation of people (as 
opposed to goods) was not commerce.106 
A fairly broad antebellum consensus maintained that interstate 
commerce under the Articles of Confederation was hampered by 
discriminatory regulations, taxes, and the lack of a uniform currency.  
Merchants in states lacking ports for foreign commerce had to pay 
tribute to those that did, through which their foreign imports had to 
pass.107  As Madison put it, “New Jersey, placed between Philadelphia 
and New York, was likened to a cask tapped at both ends; and North 
Carolina, between Virginia and South Carolina, to a patient bleeding 
at both arms.”108  To address these problems, the new Constitution 
prohibited states from laying tonnage duties and using import and 
export taxes as a source of revenue. Additionally, it authorized 
Congress to regulate foreign and interstate commerce.109  Some 
constitutional interpreters, including Daniel Webster, viewed this 
history as strong support for a dormant commerce power.110  To these 
interpreters, the Commerce Clause was intended to create a domestic 
free trade zone, unencumbered by state protectionism.111  This could 
be accomplished by striking down state laws under a dormant 
Commerce Clause, without the necessity—or even the desirability—of 
active congressional intervention.112 
At the same time, the potential breadth of the federal commerce 
power did not go unnoticed.  For example, advocates of a national 
bank argued that a federal power to charter such a bank could be 
                                               
 105. See Gillman, supra note 103, at 423–24. 
 106. See, e.g., The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 474 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting). 
 107. BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA:  FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE 
CIVIL WAR 89 (1957). 
 108. Id. 
 109. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; art. I, § 10, cls. 2–3. 
 110. See, e.g., 11 DANIEL WEBSTER, THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF DANIEL WEBSTER 
14, 18–19 (1903) (contending in Gibbons that Congress had exclusive power over 
commercial regulations, but states maintained the power to enact regulations that 
were more akin to regulations of police and only incidentally affected commerce). 
 111. See George L. Haskins, John Marshall and the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, 
104 U. PA. L. REV. 23, 26–28 (1955). 
 112. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 209 (1824) (commerce 
regulation “produces a uniform whole, which is as much disturbed and deranged by 
changing what the regulating power designs to leave untouched, as that on which it 
has operated”); id. at 18 (“All useful regulation does not consist in restraint; and that 
which Congress sees fit to leave free, is a part of its regulation, as much as the rest.”). 
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implied from the Commerce Clause.113  More generally, as Webster 
observed in his oral argument in Gibbons:  “Almost all the business and 
intercourse of life may be connected, incidentally, more or less, with 
commercial regulations.”114  Recognition of this fact could give extensive 
implied legislative powers to Congress, or equally extensive exclusive 
effect on state laws. 
B. Constitutional Politics 
Constitutional law has never existed as an autonomous thing; rather, 
it is a set of abstractions that mediate and negotiate the forces of 
constitutional politics.  The two most contested issues in the 
antebellum era were slavery and the “American System.”  The latter 
was an economic development program that included proposals for 
internal improvements, a national bank, and tariffs.115  Advocates of 
the American System believed that congressional power over these 
things could be implied from the Commerce Clause.116  But a broad 
commerce power could be construed to preempt state laws permitting 
or prohibiting slavery.  And the antennae of sensitive pro-slavery 
constitutionalists picked up alarming signals from McCulloch’s notion 
of implied powers.117  In sum, the scope of the commerce power, and 
the problem of concurrent powers, brooded over the constitutional 
politics of the latter half of the Marshall Court era, when both 
McCulloch and Gibbons were decided. 
1. Slavery 
Under the antebellum Constitution, the institution of slavery had 
three constitutionally relevant aspects:  the slave trade, the state’s 
internal policies governing slavery and race, and the extension of 
slavery to new territories and states. 
The international slave trade carried the stink of a violation of 
international law and was unpopular even with slave states that, like 
                                               
 113. See infra text accompanying notes 187–190. 
 114. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 9–10. 
 115. CURRIE, THE JEFFERSONIANS, supra note 83, at 250–51. 
 116. Schwartz, Misreading McCulloch, supra note 98, at 48–49. 
 117. See, e.g., JOHN TAYLOR, CONSTRUCTION CONSTRUED, AND CONSTITUTIONS 
VINDICATED 294–300 (1820) (connecting McCulloch, the Bank, and implied powers 
with the movement to prohibit slavery in new states); Spencer Roane, Hampden Essays 
III, Richmond Enquirer, June 18, 1819, reprinted in GUNTHER, supra note 46, at 129 
(criticizing McCulloch for authorizing “the representatives of Connecticut in 
[C]ongress . . . to make laws, on the subject of our negro population”). 
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Virginia, saw themselves as having a large stake in interstate 
importation of slaves.118  A broad consensus to ban the importation of 
slaves from abroad existed in 1787 to such an extent that South 
Carolina and Georgia had to bargain (albeit not very hard) for a 
twenty-year moratorium on a congressional prohibition of that odious 
trade.119  This was set forth in the Constitution’s “Migration or 
Importation” Clause.120  Congress acted promptly against the foreign 
slave trade, even to regulate it short of a ban prior to 1808.  President 
Jefferson’s annual message to Congress in December 1806 included a 
pointed reminder of the January 1, 1808 expiration of the 
constitutional prohibition, and, in March 1807, nine months before 
the ban would expire, Congress made it a crime, effective January 1, 
1808, “to import or bring into the United States or the territories 
thereof from any foreign kingdom, place, or country, any negro, 
mulatto, or person of colour, with intent to hold, sell, or dispose of 
such [person] . . . as a slave, to be held to service or labour.”121 
The Migration or Importation Clause’s delay of a slave-importation 
ban implies that Congress would otherwise have the power to impose 
one:  that is, the Framers understood importing slaves to be “Commerce 
with foreign Nations.”122  This understanding was amply confirmed by 
federal navigation restrictions on slave trading.  In 1794, Congress 
passed a law that made it illegal to fit out any ship for the importation of 
slaves, prohibited ships sailing from U.S. ports from slave trafficking 
abroad, and strictly regulated the size of ships transporting slaves in the 
coasting trade.123  If the international slave trade was understood to be 
foreign commerce, then the buying and selling slaves, like any other 
buying or selling, was commerce.  By extension of this principle to 
interstate commerce, the interstate slave trade could be regulated or 
prohibited by Congress under the Commerce Clause. 
                                               
 118. See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE SLAVEHOLDING REPUBLIC:  AN ACCOUNT OF THE 
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT’S RELATIONS TO SLAVERY 28 (Ward M. McAfee ed., 2001). 
 119. Id. at 33–37. 
 120. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (proclaiming that while Congress shall not prohibit 
the migrating or importing of “Persons” within the States before 1808, Congress may 
impose a maximum importation tax of ten dollars for each “Person”). 
 121. Prohibition on Slave Importations Act of 1807, Pub. L. No. 9-22, 2 Stat. 426 
(1807); 16 ANNALS OF CONG. 11–15 (1806). 
 122. See, e.g., DAVID L. LIGHTNER, SLAVERY AND THE COMMERCE POWER:  HOW THE 
STRUGGLE AGAINST THE INTERSTATE SLAVE TRADE LED TO THE CIVIL WAR 17–19 (2006). 
 123. See, e.g., Slave Trade Act of 1794, Pub. L. No. 3-11, 1 Stat. 347, 347–49 (1794). 
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What other regulation of slavery might be authorized under an 
interstate commerce power?  Even if one defines commerce as limited 
to the buying and selling of goods, the relationship between slavery 
and commerce is direct and obvious.  In theory, Congress could have 
regulated commerce in the narrowest sense—provided the “rule” for 
the buying and selling of goods—by prohibiting the interstate buying 
and selling of slave-made goods.  Even though Congress did not enact 
such a law on this pattern until the Child Labor Act of 1916,124 it seems 
highly unlikely that such a law was beyond the imagination of the 
antebellum legal mind. 
Whatever disagreements may have existed over specific applications, 
the consensus opinion in the early nineteenth century recognized that 
the Interstate Commerce Clause was designed to empower Congress to 
maintain a level playing field for interstate trade.125  Some interpreters 
would have limited this to the prohibition of state protectionism, but it 
did not escape notice that plantation-based slave labor offered certain 
competitive advantages in agricultural production over freehold 
agriculture.  That awareness, far more than human rights consciousness, 
fueled the engine of anti-slavery politics in the antebellum era.126 
Yet mainstream antebellum constitutional thought did not reason 
abstractly from a commerce power to develop theories of how slavery 
might be regulated—or abolished—under the Commerce Clause.  
Abolitionists made limited forays in this direction, but abolitionism was 
a fringe movement with little political clout.127  More typically, 
antebellum constitutionalists reasoned in the other direction:  starting 
from the bedrock assumption that slavery was a decision to be made in 
the first instance by state governments, the commerce power had to be 
interpreted accordingly.128  Thus, a 1794 petition to Congress by 
Pennsylvania abolitionists, led by Benjamin Franklin, was rebuffed with 
a House resolution stating that “Congress have no authority to interfere 
in the emancipation of slaves, or in the treatment of them within any of 
                                               
 124. Pub. L. No. 64-249, 39 Stat. 675 (1916).  The Supreme Court struck down this 
law in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276–77 (1918). 
 125. Even the pro-slavery Taney Court believed this.  See, e.g., Veazie v. Moor, 55 
U.S. (14 How.) 568, 574 (1852). 
 126. JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM:  THE CIVIL WAR ERA 54–55 (1988). 
 127. Id. at 61; see also LIGHTNER, supra note 122, at 38. 
 128. See infra Section V.A.; cf. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 611 (1842) 
(describing the fugitive slave clause as “so vital to the preservation of [the slave states’] 
domestic interests and institutions, that it cannot be doubted that it constituted a 
fundamental article, without the adoption of which the Union could not have been formed”). 
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the States; it remaining with the several States alone to provide any 
regulations therein, which humanity and true policy may require.”129 
Most antebellum constitutional interpreters took for granted that the 
“purely internal” buying and selling of slaves within a state fell outside 
the enumerated commerce power.  The same could be said for slave 
labor.  To preserve this understanding required limiting the definition 
of commerce and the extent of powers that could be implied from the 
Commerce Clause.  Thus, for example, Jefferson and other shame-faced 
slaveholders fretted continually that liberal construction of 
congressional powers would permit the regulation of “agriculture.”130  If 
we assume that Jefferson’s inability to distinguish yeoman farmers from 
plantation slaveholders was merely deluded rather than disingenuous—
a huge benefit of the doubt—then his concern to prevent Congress from 
regulating agriculture can be read as an anxiety that Congress would act 
to shift wealth from that sector into manufacturing.131  But at least some 
of Jefferson’s admirers undoubtedly used “agriculture” as a code word 
for plantation-based slavery, while others were explicit in their concern 
for the rights of slaveholders.132 
The doctrine that slavery was a “municipal” matter within the 
reserved powers of the states was not simply a southern doctrine.  
Abolitionism was not a dominant view in most northern states, yet all the 
states wanted to retain their powers to regulate race more broadly.133  
Southern states enacted slave codes, which stripped slaves of rights and 
imposed draconian behavioral restrictions on them.134  Northern states, 
to be sure, enacted laws to keep slaves out and to resist cooperating with 
slave catchers who were pursuing alleged runaways into free states under 
the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act.135  But some northern states also enacted 
                                               
 129. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1472–74 (1790) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
 130. See, e.g., 31 ANNALS OF CONG. 1139–40 (1818) (statement of Rep. Smyth) (“If reasons 
like these will justify the exercise of power, then Congress may regulate agriculture . . .”). 
 131. Cf. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 164–65 (William Peden 
ed., 1982) (admiring the yeoman farmer by professing “[t]hose who labour in the 
earth are the chosen people of God, if ever he had a chosen people, whose breasts he 
has made his peculiar deposit for substantial and genuine virtue” yet distancing the 
benefits of manufacturing by writing “for the general operations of manufacture, let 
our work-shops remain in Europe”). 
 132. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 118, at 214–15. 
 133. See id. at 28, 214–16. 
 134. See WILLIAM GOODELL, THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE:  ITS 
DISTINCTIVE FEATURES SHOWN BY ITS STATUTES, JUDICIAL DECISIONS, & ILLUSTRATIVE FACTS 9–
11 (1853) (discussing codes from South Carolina, Louisiana, Kentucky, and Maryland). 
 135. Act of February 12, 1793, 1 Stat. 302 (1793); FEHRENBACHER, supra note 118, at 214–17. 
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laws that restricted the rights of free blacks.136  The cultural, and in slave 
states legal, presumption that a black person was a slave meant that a 
black person not enslaved required an extra identifying adjective “free” 
to be known in the language, and had no rights by default, as white 
persons did, but rather only those rights enacted in positive law.137  
Northern states increasingly viewed national power as a threat to their 
own municipal institutions since the national government tended to be 
solicitous to slaveholding interests.138 
The understanding of slavery as a reserved state power was so strong 
that it stunted the development of a doctrine of federal power over the 
interstate slave trade.  Although abolitionists advanced such a doctrine in 
the 1830s and 1840s, the idea never attracted more than fringe support in 
Congress, and thus never found its way into law.139  When the Supreme 
Court finally reached this issue in the 1840s, the Justices endorsed what 
amounted to a slavery exception to the Commerce Clause.140  Although 
explicit discussion of a commerce power over the interstate slave trade 
came later, it is nevertheless likely that in 1819 this question too may have 
been a source of some anxiety in constitutional politics. 
The question of Congress’s power to prohibit slavery in the 
territories proved to be the most contentious question in antebellum 
slavery politics and ultimately the primary dispute leading to southern 
secession and the Civil War.141  Opposition to the expansion of slavery 
into the territories was far broader in northern states than 
abolitionism.  Many who were quite happy to make common cause with 
southerners on most political issues, and to tolerate slavery within the 
states where it existed, were opposed to its territorial expansion.  The 
idea that new territories and states should be reserved for free white 
labor, free from the burden of economic competition with slave 
agriculture and status competition with the social pretensions of slave 
owners, was compatible with the most virulent white racism.142 
By 1819, two features of the question of slavery in the territories had 
become obvious facts of American politics.  First, if slavery were permitted 
                                               
 136. See LEON F. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY:  THE NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES, 1790–
1860 66–69 (1961). 
 137. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1856) (holding that under the 
Constitution, African Americans “had no rights which the white man was bound to respect”). 
 138. See LITWACK, supra note 136, at 5. 
 139. See LIGHTNER, supra note 122, at 90–112. 
 140. See infra Section V.A. 
 141. See MCPHERSON, supra note 126, at 52–58. 
 142. Id. at 52–55. 
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to take root during the settlement phase of a territory, that territory would 
apply for statehood under the aegis of a pro-slavery state constitution and 
would be admitted as a slave state.143  Second, slave states were 
disproportionately represented in national politics.  Not only was each 
new state entitled to two Senators despite the relatively small populations 
of new states, but slaveholding representation was further enhanced in 
the House and the electoral college by the “three-fifths clause,” the 
Constitution’s “federal formula” which counted slaves as three-fifths of a 
person for purposes of determining population-based electoral 
representation.144  Accordingly, there were high political stakes involved 
in the question of Congress’s power to prohibit slavery in the territories. 
The territorial question had not generated extensive controversy 
prior to 1819.  But when Missouri applied to Congress for statehood in 
December 1818 with a pro-slavery constitution, its admission would 
upset the existing balance of eleven slave and eleven free states, 
thereby creating a majority of slave states for the first time since New 
Jersey abolished slavery in 1804.145  To prevent this, Representative 
Tallmadge of New York introduced an amendment to the Missouri 
admission bill in February 1819 to condition Missouri’s entry into the 
Union on its abolishing slavery in its state constitution.146  This touched 
off an intense national debate that was not resolved until the Missouri 
Compromise of 1820.  The basic features of the Missouri Compromise 
provided that Missouri would be admitted as a slave state, but that 
slavery would be prohibited in the remainder of the Louisiana territory 
north of the 36° 30 latitude line.  In addition, the district of Maine, 
ceded by Massachusetts, would be admitted as a free state, preserving 
the balance in the Senate between slave and free states.147 
The Missouri debate opened just a few days before oral argument in 
McCulloch.  The floor debate in the Senate was going on literally right 
above the Justices’ heads in late February and early March 1819—the 
                                               
 143. DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT:  THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICA, 1815–1848 137 (2007); see also MCPHERSON, supra note 126, at 52 (“Of the 
congressmen who spoke on [slavery spreading], more than half expressed confidence 
(if southern) or fear (if northern) that slavery would go into the new territories if 
allowed to do so.”). 
 144. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
 145. HOWE, supra note 143, at 147–54. 
 146. 32 ANNALS OF CONG. 1166 (1819). 
 147. An Act for the Admission of the state of Maine into the Union, 1 Stat. 544 (1820); 
see also HOWE, supra note 143, at 119–20.  Missouri itself was an exception to this 
compromise line, since that latitude represented the state’s southern boundary.  Id. 
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Supreme Courtroom’s ceiling was the Senate’s floor.148  Plainly, the 
Justices must have been aware of this debate when they decided 
McCulloch.  Did it influence the decision?  The most immediately 
relevant constitutional provisions to the Missouri debate were only 
tangentially relevant to McCulloch.149  But, the question of implied 
commerce powers might have been seen as having implications for a 
congressional power to regulate slavery. 
2. Internal improvements 
At least as dominant as the slavery question in antebellum 
constitutional politics was a long-running debate over “internal 
improvements.”  This term covered what we now call “infrastructure.”  
In the nineteenth century internal improvements involved the 
building or maintenance of roads, canals, bridges, navigable 
waterways, navigation facilities; and, later in the century, railroads and 
telegraphs.150  Internal improvements formed a key element of the 
American System, a broad program for national economic 
development that also included a national bank and protective tariffs.  
The American System was advocated by constitutional nationalists, most 
notably Henry Clay, congressman and later Senator from Kentucky, and 
was opposed by defenders of states’ rights.151  While internal 
improvements projects raised policy questions—such as feasibility, 
economic justification, and fairness in their distribution of benefits—
they were often debated as the constitutional question of whether the 
federal government had the power to engage in the projects.152 
A state’s power to improve its internal infrastructure was undoubted, 
and states undertook many such projects—the Erie Canal being the 
                                               
 148. See The Old Supreme Court Chamber: 1810–1860, SENATE, https://www.senate. 
gov/artandhistory/art/resources/pdf/Old_Supreme_Court.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2019). 
 149. The Missouri debate centered on the Territories and New States clauses.  See U.S. 
CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (“New states may be admitted by the Congress into this Union.”); 
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 151. See CURRIE, THE JEFFERSONIANS, supra note 83, at 250; HOWE, supra note 143, at 
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most famous example.153  But state-managed internal improvements 
were not enough for American System proponents.  States often lacked 
the money to pursue ambitious internal improvement projects.  
Sometimes they lacked the self-interest.  For example, a road through a 
state or a canal connecting navigable waterways might disproportionately 
benefit the terminal points of the route without significantly benefiting 
the states in between.  States dominated by elite plantation-owners were 
often reluctant to raise tax revenues to improve the commercial 
opportunities for smallholding farmers or local merchants.154  Thus, 
advocates of internal improvements had good reasons to believe that 
federal involvement was essential to make up for state lassitude in 
pursuing infrastructure projects. 
Despite the clear connection between internal improvements and 
various enumerated powers, particularly the commerce power, the federal 
power over internal improvements remained highly contested throughout 
the antebellum period.155  Opponents of internal improvements legislation 
tended to make strict constructionist arguments against implied powers 
and in favor of narrow constructions of granted powers.156  The power to 
establish post roads was not a power to build them, they argued, but merely 
a power to designate existing roads and reserve the right to traverse them.157  
Further, the power “to regulate commerce” meant only a power to 
“prescribe the manner, terms, and conditions, on which that commerce 
should be carried on,” not a power to promote commerce.158  Under this 
crabbed view, Congress had no peacetime power to build roads, and the war 
powers could not justify building roads when there was no war on.159  Both 
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Presidents Madison, prior to McCulloch, and Monroe after it, issued 
controversial vetoes of major internal improvements bills on such grounds.160 
Nationalist proponents of the American System generally argued 
that the constitutional authorization for Congress to undertake 
internal improvements projects was implied by the commerce, postal, 
or war powers.  From the first Congress, the federal government had 
built and maintained a nationwide system of aids to navigation, 
creating a legislative precedent for internal improvements under the 
commerce power, which was widely held to embrace navigation.161  
This precedent also weighed in favor of a liberal construction of 
commerce power to extend to facilitating commerce.162 
The internal improvements debate did not occur in isolation, but 
within a fabric of constitutional hopes and anxieties that included slavery 
and a concern that federal powers might constitutionally exclude parallel 
state powers, and thereby negate swaths of state police regulation.  Many 
legal thinkers viewed a power over internal improvements as a threat to 
the states’ internal regulatory system in general, and its regulation of 
slavery in particular.163  The building of a federal road could quite literally 
make an inroad into state jurisdiction.  Interestingly, many states’ rights 
advocates viewed overland internal improvements as more threatening 
than those confined to shores and waterways.  As late as the 1870s, the 
Supreme Court continued to draw this distinction.  In upholding 
congressional authority in a case that “relates to transportation on the 
navigable waters of the United States,” the Justices were “not called upon 
to express an opinion upon the power of Congress over interstate 
commerce when carried on by land transportation.”164 
No case directly ruling on the constitutionality of internal 
improvements ever came before the Marshall Court.  But between the 
Court’s decisions in McCulloch (1819) and Gibbons (1824), an important 
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episode occurred in the constitutional history of internal improvements, 
one that reveals that Marshall and his colleagues were ambivalent on this 
question.  At best, they took a cautious view toward internal improvements 
and did not believe that Congress had the power to build roads and canals 
as part of an implied power to regulate or promote commerce. 
In May 1822, President Monroe vetoed the Cumberland Road Tollgate 
bill,165 a major piece of internal improvements legislation.  The 
Cumberland (or National) Road was one of the largest internal 
improvement projects undertaken in the nation’s first half-century.  
Started during the Jefferson administration, this multi-year federal project 
contemplated an interstate highway from Maryland to Ohio.166  In the 
early 1800s, this would have been as big a deal as the transcontinental 
railroad in the mid-nineteenth century, or the interstate highway system 
in the mid-twentieth century.  The Cumberland Road was still incomplete 
by 1822, and its completed sections were in serious need of repair.  
Congress passed a bill to erect tollgates on the Cumberland Road and use 
the tolls to preserve and repair the road.  An additional provision of the 
bill would make it a federal crime to evade the duty to pay the tolls.167  
Though the federal government’s supervision would be a novelty, the use 
of tollgates for road revenues was long established on public and private 
roads within the states. 
In an unusual step, Monroe supplemented his veto message by 
issuing a 29,000 word pamphlet explaining his views.168  Monroe’s main 
objection was that a power to build and regulate a federal road, by 
cutting across dry land, implied a “system of internal improvement,” 
requiring a constellation of powers that he believed Congress did not 
have.169  These powers extended beyond merely charting and 
constructing the road, to include also the powers to condemn the 
underlying land; to build tollgates or houses and collect tolls; and to 
assert federal criminal jurisdiction over the road (to protect the road 
from toll evasion, wanton infliction of damage, and presumably 
robbery of passengers).170  Without naming the case, Monroe flagrantly 
disregarded McCulloch’s formulation regarding implied powers and 
the Necessary and Proper Clause:  “Whatever is absolutely necessary to 
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the accomplishment of the object of the grant [of power to Congress], 
though not specified, may fairly be considered as included in it.  
Beyond this the doctrine of incidental power cannot be carried.”171  
McCulloch had expressly rejected the “absolutely necessary” 
interpretation of implied powers under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.172  President Monroe went on to offer stingy interpretations of 
enumerated powers, rejecting the war, postal, territories, and 
commerce powers as grounds from which a road-building or internal 
improvements power could be implied.173  He asserted an extreme 
states’ rights interpretation of the Commerce Clause, arguing that it 
authorized Congress to regulate interstate commerce only incidentally 
to regulating foreign commerce.174   
Nevertheless, Monroe wanted federal participation in some sort of 
road-building program.175  Presiding over a period of virtual single 
party rule by Jeffersonian Republicans, now known as the “Era of Good 
Feelings,” Monroe was not inattentive to the aspirations of American 
System proponents within the nationalist wing of his party.  He thus 
offered a compromise solution.  The federal government could pay for 
roads and other internal improvements under the spending power, so 
long as those projects served “great national” rather than “strictly local” 
purposes; the federal government simply could not regulate the roads 
thus built.176  This position eventually became Jacksonian orthodoxy, 
embraced by President Jackson and the Taney Court.177 
III.  MCCULLOCH, GIBBONS AND THE NON-EMERGENCE  
OF IMPLIED COMMERCE POWERS 
Since the early decades of the twentieth century, constitutional scholars 
have taken for granted that McCulloch and Gibbons, the Marshall Court’s 
“two great nationalism decisions,” establish the constitutional foundation 
for the broad legislative powers that Congress has enjoyed since 1937.  This 
interpretation, while containing elements of truth, overlooks significant 
cross-currents and ambiguities that must be examined to understand the 
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long-running judicial resistance to implied commerce powers.  Read in the 
context of antebellum constitutional law and politics, McCulloch and Gibbons 
are more ambiguous with respect to national powers than the conventional 
interpretation acknowledges.  To see this requires examining two questions 
that have not been answered, or indeed even asked, by students of the 
Marshall Court.  First, why didn’t McCulloch uphold the Second Bank of the 
United States as an exercise of an implied power to regulate commerce?  
Second, why didn’t Gibbons refer to McCulloch or even suggest that 
regulation of navigation was a power implied from the Commerce Clause 
rather than an element of the definition of commerce itself?  As will be 
seen, the most plausible answer is that the Marshall Court, probably 
consciously, shied away from embracing the full reach of McCulloch in the 
form of implied commerce powers. 
A.   McCulloch v. Maryland 
Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch is well known to everyone with a 
legal education.178  The Court unanimously struck down a Maryland 
law that attempted to tax the operations of the Second Bank of the 
United States.179  The second part of the two-part opinion held that 
states could not tax federal instrumentalities, here a private-public 
corporation chartered by Congress to help carry out the federal 
government’s fiscal operations.180  Since everyone involved in the case 
assumed that the Bank’s quasi-governmental character depended on 
Congress’s power to charter the bank, the constitutionality of the 
charter was treated as a threshold question in the opinion’s first part.181  
After observing that the constitutionality of the Bank had been settled 
by longstanding legislative practice and acceptance by the political 
branches, Marshall’s opinion went on to offer an independent, 
confirmatory analysis.  Since the power to incorporate a bank was not 
expressly granted, Marshall had to inquire whether a Bank could be 
chartered under Congress’s implied powers.182  These implied powers 
encompassed unwritten means to execute the enumerated powers and 
are necessary to the constitutional order, Marshall argued, because a 
constitution cannot specify in detail all the different legislative ways 
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and means to carry out its granted powers.  Nor can implied powers be 
limited to those without which an expressly granted power would be 
nugatory; rather, Congress must have discretion to choose among any 
means convenient or plainly adapted to implementing the granted 
power.183  Reading the Constitution in the narrower sense would 
undermine its adaptability to unforeseen crises and its ability to endure 
over time.184  These principles are implicit in the nature of the 
Constitution, Marshall asserted, and for good measure they are 
confirmed by the Necessary and Proper Clause.  That clause was not 
intended by the framers to narrow the granted powers, but to confirm 
the existence of implied powers.185 
Marshall ultimately concluded that the Bank is constitutional because 
“it is a convenient, a useful, and essential instrument” in conducting the 
national government’s “fiscal operations.”186  He did not say it was 
necessary and proper to Congress’s power to regulate interstate 
commerce.  This omission, in light of the available arguments, is striking. 
1.  The National Bank and implied commerce power 
The constitutionality of the 1791 bill proposing to charter the First Bank 
of the United States was debated extensively in Congress and in President 
Washington’s cabinet.  Among the arguments for constitutionality, which 
included references to the taxing, borrowing, and war powers, supporters 
of the Bank argued that the bank was warranted by implied commerce 
powers.187  The existence of such powers had been acknowledged from 
earlier legislation taxing and regulating navigation and constructing 
lighthouses.188  The bill was approved by Congress, and President 
Washington asked his cabinet—Secretary of State Jefferson, Attorney 
General Randolph, and Treasury Secretary Hamilton—to advise him on 
its constitutionality.189  Jefferson and Randolph argued that it was 
unconstitutional;190 but, Hamilton convinced Washington otherwise.  
Among other points, Hamilton argued that the power to charter a 
national bank was also implied from the commerce clause, having “a 
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natural relation to the regulation of trade between the States.”191  The 
bank’s activities are “to be regarded as a regulation of trade” by providing 
“facilities to circulation and a convenient medium of exchange [and] 
alienation” and by promoting economic development.192 
By the time McCulloch was argued in the Supreme Court, these 
arguments were well known to Marshall and his colleagues.  Marshall 
researched the debates in both Congress and Washington’s cabinet 
when writing his Life of George Washington, published in four volumes 
between 1804 and 1807.193  He described these sources in detail, 
observing that the Bank’s proponents had argued, among other things 
that “[i]n all commercial countries [banks] had been resorted to as an 
instrument of great efficacy in mercantile transactions[.]”194 
At the McCulloch oral argument, the lawyers for both sides paid 
significant attention to the Commerce Clause as a potential basis for 
decision.195  All three of the Bank’s counsel argued that chartering a 
bank was an appropriate means of regulating interstate and foreign 
commerce.196  According to William Pinkney, the Bank’s lead counsel, 
the Bank had “a close connection with the power of regulating foreign 
commerce, and that between the different States” by “provid[ing] a 
circulating medium, by which that commerce can be more conveniently 
carried on, and exchanges may be facilitated.”197  For the Bank’s 
opponents, acknowledging an implied power to regulate commerce 
through a national bank charter would lead to a parade of commerce-
regulation horribles.  Walter Jones for Maryland warned that only 
measures “indispensably necessary” to commerce regulation could be 
implied under the Commerce Clause, lest a broader view of implied 
powers be construed to authorize the establishment of “an East or a West 
India company, with the exclusive privilege of trading with those parts 
of the world[.]”198  Worse, if Congress could incorporate a bank to 
regulate commerce, it could “create corporations for the purpose of 
constructing roads and canals; a power to construct which has been also 
lately discovered among other secrets of the constitution, developed by 
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this dangerous doctrine of implied powers.”199  But, Pinkney responded 
that congressional precedent had rejected the “indispensably necessary” 
standard for implied powers under the Commerce Clause:  “light 
houses, beacons, buoys, and public piers, have all been established 
under the general power to regulate commerce.”200  Because “they are 
not indispensably necessary to commerce,” the precedent demonstrated 
a congressional understanding that implied powers extended beyond 
the narrow confines of indispensably necessary measures.201 
2.  Avoiding the Commerce Clause in McCulloch 
Among McCulloch’s more intriguing and perplexing features is 
Marshall’s caginess about actually identifying one or more enumerated 
powers from which the power to incorporate a bank can be implied.  
Throughout the opinion, Marshall refers to several enumerated 
powers, but on closer inspection, one sees that none of these were 
identified as the textual source for an implied power to incorporate a 
bank.  In the end, Marshall upheld the Bank as “a convenient, a useful, 
and essential instrument in the prosecution of [the national 
government’s] fiscal operations,” cutting off further explanation with 
the assertion that a longstanding consensus of financially-inclined 
“statesmen” made it unnecessary “to enter into any discussion” of the 
point.202  Marshall mentioned the Commerce Clause (indeed, the word 
“commerce”) only twice in the entire opinion.203  In both instances, 
Marshall was making a general point about the nature of implied 
powers rather than identifying which enumerated powers were the 
basis for an implied power to incorporate a bank.204 
Marshall’s evasiveness has largely, though not entirely, escaped 
notice.  In a pseudonymous editorial attack on McCulloch, written in 
late spring 1819, Spencer Roane charged that “[the Bank’s] friends 
have not yet agreed upon the particular power to which it is to be 
attached!”205  A handful of modern scholars have echoed this 
observation.  Historian David Currie, for instance, expressed 
exasperation that “Marshall never bothered to explain how the 
                                               
 199. Id. at 368. 
 200. Id. at 385. 
 201. Id. at 385–86. 
 202. Id. at 422–23. 
 203. Id. at 407, 411. 
 204. Id. at 407–09, 411; see Schwartz, Misreading McCulloch, supra note 98, at 60–61. 
 205. GUNTHER, supra note 46, at 133. 
968 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:927 
 
establishment of the Bank was necessary, proper, or even conducive to 
the execution of any of the powers expressly granted to Congress.”206 
The most obvious way to ground the Bank in the enumerated powers 
would have been to rely on the Commerce Clause.  Marshall could 
have cited the Commerce Clause either by itself or as a first among 
equals in a list of powers from which a bank-chartering power could 
have been implied.  Not only were the arguments clearly laid out for 
Marshall by the advocates, but they were also obvious from a historical 
record with which he was thoroughly familiar. 
B.   Gibbons v. Ogden 
Gibbons v. Ogden is conventionally understood as the other of 
Marshall’s two great affirmative nationalism cases.  But like McCulloch, 
Gibbons is only somewhat nationalistic in its leaning, and through a 
combination of Marshallian caginess, limited willingness to commit 
himself, and incompletely worked-out doctrinal thinking, Gibbons 
contains important ambiguities. 
1.  The Gibbons Litigation 
The litigation in Gibbons arose out of more than a decade of legal 
wrangling over the rights to operate steam-powered vessels on the 
Hudson River.  Steamboat technology, by enabling travel against the 
current of navigable rivers, the main interstate highways in the early 
nineteenth century, held the potential to revolutionize interstate 
commerce and offered potentially enormous profits to holders of state-
issued monopolies like the partnership of Robert Livingston and Robert 
Fulton.207  Livingston, a statesman with great political influence in New 
York, and Fulton, an engineer who had made advances in steamboat 
technology, had won such a monopoly from the New York legislature.  
After losing a legal battle challenging the monopoly, Aaron Ogden 
purchased a license from the Livingston-Fulton partnership to operate a 
lucrative steamboat passenger service between New York City and 
Elizabethtown, New Jersey. Thomas Gibbons, a former partner of 
Ogden’s who was now feuding with him, began running his own 
steamboats on that route, and Ogden sued to enjoin Gibbons from 
continuing to do so.208  The chancery court issued the injunction, and the 
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decision was upheld in the chancery appellate court by the renowned 
Chancellor James Kent.209  The U.S. Supreme Court reversed.210 
On behalf of Gibbons, Daniel Webster and U.S. Attorney General 
William Wirt made a two-pronged argument.  First, the power to 
regulate navigation fell within an exclusive federal commerce power—
the dormant Commerce Clause.  Federal exclusivity made it 
unconstitutional for a state to regulate any aspect of navigation, such 
as issuing the steamboat monopoly.211  Second, Gibbons was in 
possession of a federal license to engage in the coasting trade, 
pursuant to a 1793 statute entitled, “An act for enrolling and licensing 
ships and vessels to be employed in the coasting trade and fisheries, 
and for regulating the same” (Coastal Act).212  The prima facie purpose 
of the license was to identify American-owned vessels, which were 
entitled to lower tonnage and import duties than foreign-owned 
ones.213  But, Gibbons’ lawyers argued that the federal license gave its 
holder a federal right to engage in coastal navigation.  As such, the 
state monopoly conflicted with the federal license and was therefore 
void under the Supremacy Clause.214 
Significantly, Ogden’s lawyer, Thomas Oakley, did not challenge 
Congress’s commerce power to enact the coasting license law.  Rather, 
he argued that the power to regulate navigation was an implied 
commerce power, and that “[a]ll implied powers are, of course, 
concurrent,” because to hold otherwise “would deprive the States 
almost entirely of sovereignty, as these implied powers must inevitably 
be very numerous, and must embrace a wide field of legislation.”215  In 
other words, the broad potential scope of implied powers would, if 
deemed exclusive, preempt an unacceptably wide swath of state laws.  
The state therefore had to be deemed to hold the concurrent power 
to regulate navigation, notwithstanding the Commerce Clause.  Nor 
did the coasting law conflict with the state’s concurrent power to 
regulate navigation because Congress did not intend that the license 
convey a general freedom from state regulation when plying navigable 
waterways.  Oakley was probably right on this point:  the Coasting Act 
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had been widely understood to exempt U.S. license-holders from 
“tonnage” duties imposed on foreign vessels, rather than to create a 
nationwide free-navigation zone.  Chancellor Kent had endorsed that 
limited interpretation of the Coasting Act in the lower court.216 
But Marshall struck down the New York steamboat monopoly by 
adopting Gibbons’ strained interpretation of the coasting license as a 
free navigation permit.  He might have done so by rejecting Oakley’s 
contention that all implied powers are concurrent, such that the 
exercise of a federal power over nautical traffic was field preemptive.  
Or, he could have simply pointed out that a federal free trade license 
conflicted with a state monopoly grant.  Marshall could have reached 
either of these analytical pathways by asserting, with little discussion, that 
a power to regulate navigation was necessary and proper to the 
regulation of trade—that is, an implied commerce power.  Instead, 
Marshall deemed it important to hold that navigation was not an implied 
commerce power, but rather was entailed by the definition of commerce: 
[C]ounsel for the appellee would limit [commerce regulation] to 
traffic, to buying and selling, or the interchange of commodities, 
and do not admit that it comprehends navigation.  This would 
restrict a general term, applicable to many objects, to one of its 
significations.  Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is 
something more:  it is intercourse.  It describes the commercial 
intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, 
and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that 
intercourse.  The mind can scarcely conceive a system for regulating 
commerce between nations, which shall exclude all laws concerning 
navigation, which shall be silent on the admission of the vessels of 
the one nation into the ports of the other, and be confined to 
prescribing rules for the conduct of individuals, in the actual 
employment of buying and selling, or of barter.217 
This language supplies the core of Gibbons’ famous holding, and post-
New Deal courts and commentators have interpreted this passage as 
committing American constitutional law to a broad construction of the 
Commerce Clause.218  It is noteworthy that the language misleadingly 
implies that Ogden’s lawyers argued that Congress lacked the commerce 
power to regulate navigation. But that was not true:  recall that Oakley 
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merely asserted that congressional control over navigation was an 
implied, rather than express power; that exercises of implied federal 
powers were not per se exclusive; and that the Coastal Act did not 
conflict with the steamboat monopoly. 
Although the case was ultimately decided on statutory grounds, the 
core of both sides’ arguments focused on whether the Commerce Clause 
in its dormant state precluded the New York law.219  Marshall discussed 
this argument at length and seemed ready to adopt it, but, ultimately 
relied on a statutory preemption analysis arising out of the Coasting Act, 
which would have been unnecessary under a commerce exclusivity 
disposition.220  Scholars have debated for decades why Marshall flirted so 
extensively with commerce exclusivity only to veer away at the last 
moment.221  This puzzle is wrapped in the (unnoticed) enigma of 
Marshall’s decision to ignore McCulloch and implied commerce powers. 
2.  Avoiding implied powers (1):  navigation is commerce 
Marshall introduced the famous “commerce is . . . intercourse” 
passage quoted above with this language:  “The subject to be regulated 
is commerce; and our constitution being, as was aptly said at the bar, 
one of enumeration, and not of definition, to ascertain the extent of 
the power, it becomes necessary to settle the meaning of the word.”222  
Subsequent commentators have overlooked the self-contradiction in 
this curious passage:  according to Marshall, commerce can’t be 
defined—so, he says, let’s define it.  What “was aptly said at the bar” 
was Daniel Webster’s argument that: 
It was in vain to look for a precise and exact definition of the powers of 
Congress, on several subjects.  The constitution did not undertake the 
task of making such exact definitions.  In conferring powers, it 
proceeded in the way of enumeration, stating the powers conferred, 
one after another, in few words; and, where the power was general, or 
complex in its nature, the extent of the grant must necessarily be 
judged of, and limited, by its object, and by the nature of the power.223 
Webster expressly asked the Court not to define commerce, but to 
find it exclusive in any case in which a state law affected the uniformity 
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of interstate trade.224  The purpose of the Commerce Clause, and 
indeed an overriding purpose of meeting in convention to draft the 
new Constitution, Webster argued, was to get rid of the “divers 
restrictions” by which states sought commercial advantage over one 
another, and institute “an uniform and general system.”225  These 
purposes, “[f]rom the very nature of the case,” could only be 
maintained by an exclusive federal commerce power.226  The “very 
object” of the Commerce Clause was “to take away” concurrent state 
power to regulate interstate commerce.227  Because “monopolies of 
trade and navigation” created disuniform commercial regulation, the 
power to grant them “should not be considered as still retained by the 
state.”228  In sum, Webster argued, because commerce regulation 
potentially “cover[ed] a vast field of legislation,” it was better not to 
define commerce but rather to apply exclusivity to any commerce-
related matter where federal control could operate “with more 
advantage” to “the public good.”229 
It is more than curious that Marshall treated navigation as a matter of 
the definition of commerce, rather than as an implied power under the 
Commerce Clause.  While perhaps not universal, it was certainly common 
for founding era writers to refer to “commerce” and “navigation” as 
distinct things.230  Similarly, while some members of Congress appeared 
to view navigation as a regulation of commerce per se, it was also 
commonplace to view the regulation of navigation as incidental to the 
regulation of commerce.231  Indeed, navigation regulation was held up 
time and again as a leading and uncontroversial illustration of the 
constitutional existence of implied powers. Hamilton and members of 
Congress arguing for the constitutionality of the first Bank had cited 
federal laws erecting “lighthouses, beacons, buoys” and other navigation 
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aids as legislative precedent for an implied power pursuant to the 
Commerce Clause.232  These legislative precedents were referred to 
repeatedly both inside and outside Congress.233  Marshall and his judicial 
colleague, William Johnson, both issued circuit court opinions identifying 
navigation as an implied commerce power. Four years before Gibbons, in 
The Wilson v. United States,234 Marshall had concluded that: 
From the adoption of the constitution, till this time, the universal 
sense of America has been, that the word “commerce,” as used in 
that instrument, is to be considered a generic term, comprehending 
navigation, or, that a control over navigation is necessarily incidental to the 
power to regulate commerce.235 
In Elkison v. Deliesseline (1823),236 Johnson stated that “the navigation 
of ships has always been held, by all nations, to appertain to commercial 
regulations.”237  The word “appertain” refers to implied powers.238  The 
view that a federal power to regulate navigation could be implied under 
the commerce power was so well-established by 1824 that counsel for 
Ogden had to concede in the Gibbons oral argument that “laws 
regulating light houses, buoys, &c. are all exercises of the implied 
powers derived from that of regulating commerce.”239 
Gibbons, then, presented Marshall with the opportunity not only to 
reaffirm and build on McCulloch, but to endorse the idea of implied 
                                               
 232. See supra notes 187–192 and accompanying text. 
 233. As summarized in an 1808 district court decision, the term “commerce” in the 
Constitution:  
does not necessarily include shipping or navigation; much less does it include 
the fisheries.  Yet it never has been contended, that they are not the proper 
objects of national regulation; and several acts of congress have been made 
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intimately connected with it; and that congress, in legislating respecting them, 
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necessary and proper, for carrying into execution the enumerated powers. 
United States v. The William, 28 F. Cas. 614, 621 (D. Mass. 1808) (No. 16,700). 
 234. 30 F. Cas. 239, 243 (C.C.D. Va. 1820) (No. 17,846). 
 235. Id. (emphasis added). 
 236. 8 F. Cas. 493 (C.C.D.S.C. 1823). 
 237. Id. at 495 (emphasis added). 
 238. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 418 (1819) (“[T]he 
power of punishment appertains to sovereignty, and may be exercised whenever the 
sovereign has a right to act, as incidental to his constitutional powers.”); A Friend of the 
Constitution, in GUNTHER, supra note 46, at 171 (“An ‘incident,’ Hampden tells us, ‘is 
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being more worthy or principal.’”). 
 239. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 117 (1824). 
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commerce powers, with its hugely expansive potential for federal 
legislative power.  But, Marshall not only declined to cite McCulloch in his 
Gibbons opinion; at times he wrote as if its implied powers holding did not 
even exist.  After his initial assertion that “commerce” means “commercial 
intercourse,” Marshall argued that the term must include navigation, 
because “[i]f commerce does not include navigation, the government of 
the Union has no direct power over that subject, and can make no law 
prescribing what shall constitute American vessels, or requiring that they shall be 
navigated by American seamen.”240  This assertion makes no sense—indeed, 
is plainly wrong—according to McCulloch’s understanding of implied 
powers.  Under McCulloch, the absence of a “direct” (read, enumerated) 
power should not negate an implied power over navigation. 
Marshall seemed to bend over backwards to view navigation regulation 
as “direct” commerce regulation rather than an implied commerce 
power.  He claimed to find further proof that commerce includes 
navigation in the 1807 Embargo Act.241  That act implemented President 
Jefferson’s foreign policy of economic retaliation against Britain’s practice 
of stopping U.S. merchant ships and impressing American sailors into 
British naval service.  “By its friends and its enemies,” Marshall argued, the 
Embargo Act “was treated as a commercial, not as a war measure.”242  But 
this passage only demonstrates that commerce regulation implies—rather 
than definitionally includes—a power over navigation.  An embargo is a 
prohibition of trade:  it forbids U.S. ships to carry trade goods to the target 
nation, prohibits the target nation ships from landing in U.S. ports, and 
authorizes the seizure of target nation ships in American territorial waters.  
Such navigation regulations are auxiliary means to prevent the trading of 
goods with the foreign nation.  A power to impose an embargo merely 
implies a power over navigation. 
One might argue that an implied powers approach would have been 
narrower than the definitional approach adopted by Marshall.  Before 
Gibbons, this argument would go, implied powers would be constrained 
by the narrow “trade-only” understanding of commerce; after Gibbons, 
implied powers can be attached to a broader base of a “trade-plus-
navigation” definition of commerce.  But consider how the Gibbons 
opinion might have read if Marshall had built on McCulloch rather than 
treating the issue as “one of definition” of the term “commerce.”  The 
                                               
 240. Id. at 190. 
 241. Embargo Act of 1807, 2 Stat. 451, 451–52 (1807), repealed by Act of January 9, 
1808, 2 Stat. 453 (1808); Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 190–93. 
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following hypothetical revision of Gibbons’ key language (indicated in 
bold and strikeouts) illustrates my point: 
The subject to be regulated is commerce; and our constitution 
being, as was aptly said at the bar, one of enumeration, and not of 
definition, to ascertain the extent of the power, it becomes necessary 
is vain to settle the meaning of the word.  The counsel for the 
appellee would limit it to traffic, to buying and selling, or the 
interchange of commodities, and do not admit that it comprehends 
navigation.  This would unduly restrict a general term delegation of 
power, applicable to many objects, to one of its significations 
applications.  Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it the power of 
Congress to regulate commerce is something much more:  it is 
intercourse.  As this Court said in the case of McCulloch v. The State 
of Maryland, the legislative powers of the government extend to all 
legislative means, “which are appropriate, which are plainly 
adapted” to executing the enumerated powers; in this case, the 
power to regulate trade among the states or with foreign nations or 
Indian tribes.  It describes the commercial intercourse between 
nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by 
prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse.  As was aptly said 
at the bar, “[a]lmost all the business and intercourse of life may be 
connected, incidentally, more or less, with commercial 
regulations.”243  Whatever else may be comprehended by “that vast 
mass of incidental powers which must be involved in” the regulation 
of commerce, see McCulloch, those incidental powers over commerce 
undoubtedly include the power to regulate navigation.  The mind 
can scarcely conceive a system for regulating commerce between 
nations, which shall exclude all laws concerning navigation . . . . 
By applying McCulloch’s analysis of implied powers to the Commerce 
Clause in Gibbons, Marshall could have thrown the door open to a wide 
array of legislative means deemed by Congress to be “appropriate” and 
“plainly adapted” to the regulation of interstate trade.  This could 
extend to internal improvements, and the regulation of agriculture, 
manufactures, and slavery.  And that was precisely the problem.  
Applying McCulloch to the Commerce Clause was too expansive for 
Marshall.  But by instead making the question turn on the definition 
of commerce, Gibbons in effect, suggested that each assertion of 
regulatory power onto a new object other than navigation (internal 
improvements, agriculture, slavery) would require a new definitional 
battle over the meaning of commerce.  It is far easier to say that 
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building roads is “plainly adapted” to regulating commerce than that 
roadbuilding is commerce.  At oral argument, Webster asserted that 
road-building might be incidental to, but was not in itself, commerce 
regulation.244  McCulloch’s implied powers analysis is based on a much 
looser concept of relatedness than the addition of dictionary meanings 
to a word or phrase.  Moreover, Marshall in effect shifted the decision 
from a deferentially-reviewed congressional determination of 
“appropriate” or “plainly adapted” means to a rigorous judicial 
determination of the definition of a word in the Constitution. 
3. Avoiding implied powers (2):  reaching “into the interior” 
The question of implied powers arises not only in the relationship 
between commerce and navigation, but also in the relationship 
between interstate and intrastate commerce.  The Commerce Clause 
enumerates three federal commerce powers:  over commerce (1) “with 
foreign Nations,” (2) “among the several States,” and (3) “with the 
Indian Tribes.”245  After noting this constitutional text, Marshall says: 
the enumeration of the particular classes of commerce, to which the 
power was to be extended, would not have been made, had the 
intention been to extend the power to every description.  The 
enumeration presupposes something not enumerated; and that 
something, if we regard the language or the subject of the sentence, 
must be the exclusively internal commerce of a State.246 
This raised a factual problem regarding the steamboat monopoly.  
New York claimed that the Hudson River was an entirely New York 
waterway, so that most of the route controlled by the monopoly was 
intrastate.  Its interstate element occurred only at the New Jersey ferry 
terminal.247  Looked at one way, the monopoly regulated intrastate 
commerce and only incidentally touched on interstate commerce, and 
one possible resolution would have been to let the monopoly stand as 
far as it concerned service entirely within New York.  But, the Court 
wanted to embrace Webster’s argument that intrastate sections of 
navigable waterways could not be separated from the system of free 
interstate navigation, which therefore had to be kept free even from 
intrastate obstructions.  “Every district has a right to participate in 
                                               
 244. Id. at 20 (“[G]enerally speaking, roads, and bridges, and ferries, though, of 
course, they affect commerce and intercourse, do not obtain that importance and 
elevation, as to be deemed commercial regulations.”). 
 245. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 246. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194–95. 
 247. Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, supra note 17, at 584 n.77, 597. 
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[interstate commerce].  The deep streams which penetrate our country 
in every direction, pass through the interior of almost every State in the 
Union, and furnish the means of exercising this right.”248  Thus, 
Marshall had to say that federal commerce power could reach at least 
some intrastate commerce. 
In making this point, Marshall wrote two key passages whose ambiguity 
charted the divergent course of Commerce Clause jurisprudence for the 
next two centuries.  The first defined the Constitution’s phrase 
“commerce . . . among the several States.”249  Marshall began with the 
crucial assertion that “Commerce among the States, cannot stop at the 
external boundary line of each State, but may be introduced into the 
interior.”250  But, he immediately shifted to defining the concept by 
negative implication from reserved state powers: 
It is not intended to say that these words comprehend that 
commerce, which is completely internal, which is carried on 
between man and man in a State, or between different parts of the 
same State, and which does not extend to or affect other States.  
Such a power would be inconvenient, and is certainly unnecessary. 
Comprehensive as the word “among” is, it may very properly be 
restricted to that commerce which concerns more States than 
one . . . .  The completely internal commerce of a State, then, may 
be considered as reserved for the State itself.251 
On one hand, this passage suggests broadening federal powers, and 
the Court 120 years later would turn this language into the substantial 
effects test.252  On the other hand, the rhetorical emphasis is on restriction 
of the federal power; note, too, the backhanded reference to McCulloch 
in the negative form of the words “convenient” and “necessary.” 
In the second key passage, Marshall argued at length that the state’s 
power to inspect out-of-state trade goods did not demonstrate a state 
power to regulate interstate commerce.  State inspection laws were a 
leading example of 
that immense mass of legislation, which embraces every thing within 
the territory of a State, not surrendered to the general government:  
all which can be most advantageously exercised by the States 
themselves. Inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every 
description, as well as laws for regulating the internal commerce of 
                                               
 248. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 195. 
 249. Id. at 193. 
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a State, and those which respect turnpike roads, ferries, &c., are 
component parts of this mass. 
No direct general power over these objects is granted to Congress; 
and, consequently, they remain subject to State legislation.253 
Marshall hints that these are not utterly beyond the reach of Congress: 
If the legislative power of the Union can reach them, it must be for 
national purposes; it must be where the power is expressly given for 
a special purpose, or is clearly incidental to some power which is 
expressly given.  It is obvious, that the government of the Union, in 
the exercise of its express powers, that, for example, of regulating 
commerce with foreign nations and among the States, may use 
means that may also be employed by a State, in the exercise of its 
acknowledged powers; that, for example, of regulating commerce 
within the State.254 
Here, Marshall reaffirmed the existence of implied powers in a general 
way, albeit in the course of reaffirming the reserved powers of the states.  
He also hints that implied powers can be applied to the Commerce Clause.  
But the application of this principle is relatively narrow.  He continues: 
If Congress license vessels to sail from one port to another, in the same 
State, the act is supposed to be, necessarily, incidental to the power 
expressly granted to Congress, and implies no claim of a direct power 
to regulate the purely internal commerce of a State, or to act directly 
on its system of police.  So, if a State, in passing laws on subjects 
acknowledged to be within its control, and with a view to those 
subjects, shall adopt a measure of the same character with one which 
Congress may adopt, it does not derive its authority from the 
particular power which has been granted, but from some other, which 
remains with the State, and may be executed by the same means.255 
Marshall’s general hints about implied commerce powers can be 
read in a manner limited to the two main points Marshall was here 
attempting to make.  First, Marshall reasserted that commerce 
regulation can cross state lines.  Note that here he merely hinted, slyly, 
that Congress had the power to regulate port-to-port intrastate 
navigation, and did not clearly make that part of Gibbons’ holding.  He 
left that to follow-up litigation in the New York courts.256  Second, 
Marshall affirmed the concept of separate regulatory spheres:  the fact 
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that the federal and state governments may use legislative means 
resembling one another’s powers does not prove that they possess one 
another’s powers concurrently.  A significant implication of this 
passage is the notion that states have incidental powers to engage in 
what looks like commerce (or other federal) regulation—an idea that 
the Taney Court would make much of, as we shall see. 
Significantly, nothing in this passage or elsewhere broadens the 
substance of what may be regulated as an implied commerce power 
beyond commerce itself—trade and, after Gibbons, navigation. 
Marshall’s suggestion that federal commerce regulations may follow 
trade goods or navigation across state lines into the interior of a state 
does not necessarily suggest that Congress may, under its commerce 
power, build roads or regulate slavery.  To be sure, one could exploit 
Gibbons’ suggestion that commercial intercourse is commerce and 
argue that such intercourse includes commercial traffic on roads.  But, 
objections to such an analogy would be easy to make:  antebellum 
constitutional thought viewed exercises of power on dry land as 
different from those on water.  Webster seemed to know his audience, 
perhaps from the Court’s unwillingness to embrace a power over 
internal improvements in McCulloch.  In arguing Gibbons, he worked 
assiduously to avoid proving too much, carefully distinguishing 
between navigation, an acceptable commercial power, and internal 
improvements, a controversial one.  While arguing that “[i]t is a 
common principle, that arms of the sea, including navigable rivers, 
belong to the sovereign” as part of commerce regulation, Webster 
conceded that the commerce power did not authorize Congress to 
“establish ferries, turnpikes, bridges, &c. and provide for all this detail 
of interior legislation.”257  Marshall embraced this distinction, revealing 
a conservative edge to the definitional approach.  He asserted, quite 
accurately, that “[a]ll America understands, and has uniformly 
understood, the word ‘commerce,’ to comprehend navigation.”258  
Navigation seems to have been unique in its national character.  This 
distinction would encourage a future Court to reject novel or 
contested definitions of commerce; it certainly cuts against readings of 
Gibbons that suggest the case offered leading, rather than lagging, 
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interpretations of congressional power.259  However much it may have 
encouraged later Congresses to push the boundaries of its powers, 
Gibbons also invited later Courts to refuse to extend the definition of 
commerce beyond trade-plus-navigation.  In fact, the latter is exactly 
what happened over the next century. 
4.  Separate spheres:  commerce exclusivity and reserved powers 
It is well known that Marshall’s opinion in Gibbons did not resolve 
the question of whether the commerce power was exclusive.  Famously, 
Marshall recited Webster’s exclusivity argument at great length only to 
stop short of implementing it.  He concluded “[t]here is great force in 
this argument, and the Court is not satisfied that it has been refuted.”260  
There, the exclusivity discussion ends, and Marshall at that point shifted 
to inquire whether the steamboat monopoly grant “come[s] into 
collision with an act of Congress, and deprived a citizen of a right to 
which that act entitles him.”261  This inquiry, spanning the next twelve 
pages of the opinion, concluded that the federal coasting license law 
does indeed collide with the steamboat monopoly.262  Johnson, 
chagrined by this (in his view) cop-out, wrote separately to concur in the 
judgment, but upon the “materially different” ground of Commerce 
Clause exclusivity.  “If there was any one object riding over every other 
in the adoption of the [C]onstitution, it was to keep the commercial 
intercourse among the States free from all invidious and partial 
restraints.”263  Thus, even if “the licensing act was repealed tomorrow,” 
Gibbons’ right to run his steamboat route irrespective of the New York 
monopoly grant “would be as strong as it is under this license.”264 
Why would Marshall flirt so extensively with a broad negative 
commerce argument only to veer away sharply and rely on a statutory 
preemption argument?  For nearly two centuries, this feature of Gibbons 
has puzzled courts and commentators, some of whom simply decided to 
misread Gibbons as though the Court had in fact held that federal 
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commerce power was exclusive.265  Felix Frankfurter’s reading, though 
perceptive, was more of a description than an explanation:  Marshall’s 
attraction to “the opportunities presented by the [C]ommerce [C]lause 
to restrain local legislatures from hampering the free play of commerce 
among the states” was tempered by his “hardheaded” and “pragmatic” 
“empiricism in not tying the Court to rigid formulas for accomplishing 
such restrictions.”266  Frankfurter went on to suggest that this made 
Marshall indecisive or “confused” between his two choices.267 
Marshall was both less and more confused than Frankfurter 
suggested.  In general, Marshall preferred to rely on interpreting 
federal statutes rather than constitutional provisions to dispose of 
difficult federal-state power conflicts.268  This was consistent with 
Marshall’s penchant for avoiding the appearance of judicial activism.  
Significantly, a dormant commerce “power” is really a power of the 
Court. By definition, it relies on the Commerce Clause itself in the 
absence of legislation, and can only be enforced by judicial decision.  
Gibbons fits the pattern of Marshall’s decisions described by legal 
historian William Nelson, in which Marshall deferred contested policy 
matters to the political branches while issuing constitutional 
interpretations on consensus principles.269  In Gibbons, Marshall 
constitutionalized the broad consensus supporting national control 
over navigable waterways by making navigation part of the definition 
of commerce.  But when it came to the potentially volatile question of 
choosing that policy, he attributed to Congress the choice to make 
navigation free and to disempower state legislatures from granting 
nautical monopolies.270  Marshall’s extended flirtation with dormant 
commerce exclusivity was not confused, but strategically layered.  It 
showed states’ rights advocates that Marshall could have decided the 
case in a more far-reaching and intrusive way.  Relying on the statutory 
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ground, Marshall nevertheless left the threat of exclusivity hanging, 
while reassuringly refraining from using it. 
A second, stronger reason for Marshall to veer away from Commerce 
Clause exclusivity was his uncertainty about its doctrinal logic and 
implications.  He was understandably reluctant to endorse a doctrine 
that the dormant commerce power excluded all state police power laws 
affecting interstate commerce.  The problem was that many, if not 
most exercises of state police powers did have such an effect.  A general 
theory of commerce power exclusivity would therefore raise vexed 
questions about invalidating the reserved powers of the states to 
regulate health, safety, morals—and race.  Marshall had not worked 
out a general exclusivity theory that could invalidate selected state 
police powers while preserving others so as to avoid explosive 
controversies.  Neither had Webster, who urged, somewhat confusedly, 
that the commerce power, though exclusive, was a power “to give the 
general rule” from which exceptions would be recognized through “a 
most reasonable construction” of the Constitution “as necessary to the 
just power of the States” in cases “where the States can operate with 
more advantage to the community.”271  Nor had any other judges 
solved this problem, nor would they, so long as jurists were fixed on 
the idea that the federal government and states occupied separate 
spheres of legislative power that differed by subject matter.  The Court’s 
nineteenth century solution, reached nearly thirty years after Gibbons, 
was to take dormant commerce exclusivity challenges on a case-by-case 
basis.272  The Court’s twentieth century solution was to make concurrent 
powers the rule and exclusivity the exception, not based on subject 
matter, but only when state laws discriminated against commerce from 
other states or unduly burdened its interstate passage.273 
Marshall could not shake the separate spheres idea, as demonstrated 
by his confused and ultimately unpersuasive argument that states 
lacked a power to regulate interstate commerce.274  He went to great 
lengths to explain that police power laws were different from 
commercial regulations, even claiming that identical federal and state 
laws inspecting the quality of trade goods were fundamentally different 
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because they came from different sources:  the federal law came from 
the commerce power and the state law from the police power.275  But 
that is a mere tautology.  Compounding the problem was Marshall’s 
inability to reconcile this claim with his repeated acknowledgment that 
states had the power to regulate their “completely internal” commerce. 
In several other passages, Marshall contradicted himself by writing 
as if an exclusive federal commerce power is incompatible with any 
state regulation of commerce.  This in part stemmed from his tendency 
to lapse into an imprecision, not atypical of both antebellum and 
modern judges, to describe the federal power as a power over 
“commerce” without the “foreign” or “interstate” qualification.  “We 
are now arrived at the inquiry,” Marshall wrote, “What is this power?  It 
is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which 
commerce [sic] is to be governed.”276  More tellingly, he never offered 
a single example of “completely internal” state commerce regulation.  
On the contrary, whenever he discussed specific types of state laws that 
are not precluded by the federal commerce power, he took pains to 
show that they were properly characterized as police and not commerce 
regulations.  For example, while conceding “[t]hat [state] inspection 
laws may have a remote and considerable influence on commerce,” 
Marshall vehemently denied “that a power to regulate commerce is the 
source from which the right to pass them is derived[.]”277 
These difficulties bring us back to Marshall’s choice not to treat 
navigation as an implied power.  He was uncertain about the exclusive 
effect of federal statutes.  To hold that an express constitutional grant 
of federal power could make such an inroad was contentious enough; 
to hold that implied powers could do so would have raised a difficult 
question.  Could an implied power be field-preemptive in the same way 
that at least some enumerated powers were?  Johnson’s circuit opinion 
in Elkison answered yes.278  In the Gibbons hearing, counsel for the 
steamboat monopoly argued no:  “All implied powers are, of course, 
concurrent,” Oakley contended, because to hold otherwise “would 
deprive the States almost entirely of sovereignty, as these implied 
powers must inevitably be very numerous, and must embrace a wide 
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field of legislation.”279  In other words, clever lawyers might challenge 
state laws by arguing that as-yet-unexercised implied powers excluded 
state laws.  This might, as Chancellor Kent had argued in Livingston, 
leave state legislatures guessing about what laws might be excluded.280  
Even if one’s theory were that implied powers could be invoked only 
where Congress had legislated, there remained disagreement or 
confusion about the preemptive effect of statutes:  Did they occupy an 
entire field or only displace conflicting state laws?  Note, too that that 
distinction would not have been clear in the antebellum era.  Marshall 
muddied these waters further by interpreting federal licensing statutes 
as creating nationwide free trade rights, which essentially rendered the 
distinction between field and conflict preemption moot.281  By making 
navigation an element of a definition of the word commerce in the 
Constitution, Marshall sidestepped these problems. 
5.  The limits of Gibbons 
It would be silly to argue that Marshall shrank the reach of the 
Commerce Clause in Gibbons.  But there is a broad middle ground 
between that conclusion and the open-ended expansion of the 
commerce power with which Marshall’s opinion has been credited.  As 
he did in McCulloch, Marshall took a middle ground with studied 
ambiguity.  He offered hints and phrases that readers could, and 
eventually did, construe as suggesting the substantial effects test by 
which the modern Commerce Clause has been interpreted as 
something approaching a power to legislate for the general welfare.  At 
the same time, Gibbons is chock-full of language suggesting more 
limited interpretations.  The opinion can be read to confine implied 
commerce powers to the idea that commerce regulation narrowly 
construed as buying, selling, or transportation, can reach only as far as 
seemingly intrastate commercial practices that affect interstate 
commerce.  That is to say, implied powers could not reach things that 
were not deemed “commerce.”  This is how Gibbons was understood in 
the Lochner era.282  And the opinion can even be understood to mean 
that state laws can be immunized from commerce regulation if they are 
                                               
 279. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 37.  While there is some support in Gibbons for such 
a distinction between express and implied powers, Marshall does not clarify whether 
federal statutes enacted under implied commerce powers would be field-preemptive. 
 280. 9 Johns. 507, 576 (N.Y. 1812) (“Such a doctrine would be constantly taxing our sagacity, 
to see whether the law might not contravene some future regulation of commerce . . . .”). 
 281. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 221. 
 282. See infra Section V.A. 
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properly characterized as police power laws.  This is how the Taney 
Court understood Gibbons, as discussed in the next section.  Indeed, a 
sign of the limits of Gibbons’ nationalism, or at least its profound 
ambiguity, is its favorable reception in the Jacksonian-dominated Taney 
Court.  While ignoring or even flouting McCulloch, Taney Court Justices 
celebrated Gibbons as the leading case and authoritative interpretation 
of the Commerce Clause.283  The Taney Court’s comfort with Gibbons 
supports the notion that the case could easily be read to fit into a 
jurisprudence of moderate unionism that tilted toward state sovereignty. 
IV.    IMPLIED COMMERCE POWERS IN THE TANEY COURT 
The Taney Court decided four major cases between 1837 and 1852 that 
struggled with the tension between the Commerce Clause and reserved 
state powers.  The four cases are unified by a single theme—the power of 
states to keep out undesirable persons or things—and driven by an 
overriding concern to sustain the power of states to regulate race and 
slavery, without interference from the federal commerce power. 
In New York v. Miln,284 the Court upheld a New York law that required 
ships entering the port of New York to submit written information 
about disembarking passengers and post a bond to cover the potential 
costs to the city of hosting paupers or diseased persons.285  Following 
Miln, the Court upheld state laws barring slave importation, in Groves 
v. Slaughter,286 and regulating liquor sales, in The License Cases,287 but 
struck down a state tax on interstate and foreign passenger arrivals, in 
The Passenger Cases.288  These cases reflected continuing internal 
disagreement and doctrinal uncertainty.  The three post-Miln cases 
showed the Taney Court at its most perplexed, producing nineteen 
separate opinions.  Before Cooley v. Board of Wardens,289 the Justices were 
unable to reach consensus on the proper analysis to determine when 
a state law was claimed to violate the federal commerce power.290  Yet 
                                               
 283. Gibbons’ primary holdings were cited seventeen times in support of the judgment 
in Taney Court decisions.  McCulloch was cited was cited only once for a proposition 
relating to implied powers.  See United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. 526, 537 (1840). 
 284. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837). 
 285. Id. at 130–31. 
 286. 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449, 504 (1841). 
 287. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 573 (1847). 
 288. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849). 
 289. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). 
 290. See The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 573 (Taney, C.J., concurring) 
(noting the disagreement amongst the Justices regarding the underlying principles 
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only The Passenger Cases produced sharp disagreement over the result, 
when the Justices divided 5–4 in deciding to nullify municipal taxes on 
arriving immigrants in the ports of New York and Boston.291  When it 
came to the primacy of the states’ core reserved powers, particularly 
the power to control slavery and race matters, the Taney Court Justices 
showed remarkable consensus.  This consensus entailed a rejection of 
McCulloch’s idea of implied powers, at least in Commerce Clause cases.  
A.   Limiting Gibbons:  Federal Power versus State Police Power 
The issue in each case was whether the federal commerce power, 
either in its dormant state or in light of a federal statute or treaty, 
nullified a state law exercising the state’s “police power.”  The 1837 
decision in Miln established a pattern for how the Taney Court would 
approach these cases.  Miln involved a challenge to a New York law that 
required the master or owner of any ship landing in New York harbor 
to submit a written report providing the name, birthplace, residence, 
age and occupation of all foreign or interstate passengers, and to post 
a bond for the costs of maintenance or removal of impoverished 
immigrants.292  The law plainly regulated navigation, which was 
commerce under Gibbons, and indeed Congress had already imposed 
similar regulations on arriving immigrants.293  But, the Court, over the 
lone dissent of Justice Story, upheld the law on the ground that it was 
a “police” regulation designed to aid the state’s ability to “guard 
against” “the moral pestilence of paupers, vagabonds, and possibly 
convicts” by controlling immigration.294  The Court tried half-heartedly 
to emphasize the law’s intrastate aim of regulating passengers after 
debarkation, when they had merged with the residents of New York 
                                               
governing the case); Felix Frankfurter, Taney and the Commerce Clause, 49 HARV. L. REV. 
1286, 1288 (1936) (explaining the divergent views between Taney and other members 
of the court over Chief Justice Marshall’s interpretation of the Commerce Clause); see 
also Brannon P. Denning, Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 50 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 417, 432 (2008) (citing 5 CARL B. SWISHER, THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 
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1836–64 388 (1974) (“In three of the four [Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine] 
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 291. 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 392, 409–10 (McLean, J., dissenting). 
 292. New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 130–31 (1837). 
 293. Id. at 138; see Steerage Act of 1819, 3 Stat. 488 (1819). 
 294. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 142. 
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and come within its jurisdiction.295  The New York law, according to 
Justice Barbour’s majority opinion, was as much a matter of the 
“acknowledged and undisputed jurisdiction for every purpose of 
internal regulation” as was the state’s power to prosecute a foreign 
sailor committing a crime on the streets of New York while his ship was 
in port.296  Having characterized the law as an internal police law rather 
than a regulation of commerce, and thus “the exercise of a power which 
rightfully belonged to the states,” the Court asserted that it was unnecessary 
to consider “whether the power to regulate commerce, be or be not 
exclusive of the states.”297 But this was unconvincing:  regulating passengers 
at the point of debarkation plainly regulated the preceding journey. 
While none of the opinions in the Taney Court’s commerce decisions 
cited McCulloch on implied powers or federal supremacy, they virtually all 
treated Gibbons as the leading case for construing the Commerce 
Clause.298  But they construed Gibbons with a significant twist.  In Gibbons, 
Marshall had made a point of asserting that state laws incidentally 
affecting commerce—quarantine and inspection laws, for example—did 
not prove the existence of a concurrent state power to regulate interstate 
and foreign commerce because the laws came from a different source:  
namely, police powers.299  In Miln, and thereafter, the Court turned this 
notion on its head:  because the law came from a different source (police 
powers), it did not by definition primarily involve commerce.300 
Miln thus created a template in which the Court would uphold state 
laws, irrespective of their effect on foreign or interstate commerce, if 
the laws could plausibly be characterized as police regulations.  In The 
License Cases, where the Court reviewed state laws that required a 
license to sell liquor and regulated the amount to be sold, it was 
difficult to characterize the regulations as non-commercial.301  While 
some of the Justices in that case’s six separate opinions emphasized 
that the laws regulated purely intrastate buying and selling, the 
                                               
 295. Id. at 138–39 (“[W]hen they have ceased to have any [connection] with the 
ship, and when, therefore, they have ceased to be passengers; we are satisfied that acts 
of congress . . . can . . . be said to come into conflict with the law of a state . . . .”). 
 296. Id. at 135, 140. 
 297. Id. at 132. 
 298. The Taney Court consensus was that Congress was properly placed in charge 
of maintaining equal access of all United States citizens to the nation’s navigable 
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 299. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9. Wheat.) 1, 204 (1824). 
 300. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 102, 132. 
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dominant factor was captured by Justice Grier:  “the true question 
presented by these cases, and one which I am not disposed to evade, 
is, whether the States have a right to prohibit the sale and consumption 
of an article of commerce which they believe to be pernicious in its 
effects, and the cause of disease, pauperism, and crime.”302 That is to 
say, upholding the state law required emphasizing its purpose as 
regulating health, safety, or morals. As Taney put it “disease, 
pestilence, and pauperism are not subjects of commerce.”303  
B.   Reversing McCulloch:  the Idea of State Self-Defense 
Taney Court Justices could hardly obscure the fact that the state laws 
in all of these cases had a significant effect on foreign or interstate 
commerce, which should have brought them within the ambit of 
federal power under Gibbons and McCulloch.  It was here that the Taney 
Court developed a doctrine that put McCulloch in reverse.  Justice 
Barbour, a states’ rights firebrand from Virginia, led the way with his 
opinion in Miln.  Borrowing language from McCulloch, Barbour 
asserted that when a state acts within 
the legitimate scope of its power as to the end to be attained, it may 
use whatsoever means, being appropriate to that end, it may think 
fit; although they may be the same, or so nearly the same, as scarcely 
to be distinguishable from those adopted by congress acting under 
a different power . . . .304 
To be sure, “in the event of collision, the law of the state must 
yield.”305  But in the absence of such collision—and the Court found 
none here in Miln—the state had “not only the right, but the bounden 
and solemn duty . . . to advance the safety, happiness and prosperity of 
its people, and to provide for its general welfare, by any and every act 
of legislation, which it may deem to be conducive to these ends.”306  When it 
came to “all those powers which relate to merely municipal legislation, 
or what may, perhaps, more properly be called internal police, . . . the 
authority of a state is complete, unqualified, and exclusive.”307 
This reserved powers manifesto reversed McCulloch in two respects.  
First, it suggested that the states’ reserved powers could defeat at least 
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some plausible claims of implied powers under McCulloch.  An implied 
power is one that is not expressly granted to Congress, and thus 
presumptively reserved to the states, except to the extent it is 
conducive to executing an enumerated power.  But Barbour said that 
state police powers are “exclusive.”308  More moderate Taney Court 
Justices subsequently agreed, in language negating McCulloch, that a 
state’s internal trade was “beyond the reach of Congress.”309  Despite 
differences of opinion on the Court regarding Commerce Clause 
exclusivity and federal power over immigration, no justice—not even 
Justice Story—appears to have dissented from this robust description 
of reserved state powers.310 
Pushing beyond that, Taney Court Justices argued that state police 
powers carry implied powers that may extend into the ambit of the 
federal commerce power.  In Miln, the New York passenger-report law 
was not in itself a regulation of foreign paupers entering the state, but 
a regulation of navigation used as means to that end.311  So long as the 
end was legitimate—within state police powers—states could use 
legislative means that were indistinguishable from commerce 
regulation.312  Likewise, in The Passenger Cases, Chief Justice Taney 
argued that regulating passengers generally was necessary and proper to 
the state’s reserved power to exclude “any person, or class of persons, 
whom it might deem dangerous to its peace, or likely to produce a 
physical or moral evil among its citizens,” notwithstanding its incidental 
effect on foreign commerce.313  This was truly McCulloch in reverse. 
A broad Taney Court consensus held that the concept of reserved 
state powers “has its foundation in the sacred law of self-defence, which 
no power granted to Congress can restrain or annul.”314  Justice 
                                               
 308. Id. 
 309. The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 608 (1847) (Catron, J.) (“[T]he 
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Barbour’s assertion in Miln that reserved powers were “complete, 
unqualified, and exclusive” was not simply the ranting of a states’-rights 
firebrand.  Justice John McLean, a Whig from Ohio appointed to the 
Court as a bipartisan maneuver by President Jackson, was the Taney 
Court’s most sustained and die-hard proponent of exclusive federal 
commerce power.  McLean contended that that the commerce power 
was exclusive because “A concurrent power in two distinct 
sovereignties to regulate the same thing is as inconsistent in principle 
as it is impracticable in action.  It involves a moral and physical 
impossibility.”315  Yet this strict and formalistic notion of exclusive 
federal commerce power was a double-edged sword, with a sharp 
states’ rights edge, for McLean, too, embraced a strong version of 
reserved state powers, linking police powers with an ultimate state 
sovereign power of self-preservation: 
Every thing prejudicial to the health or morals of a city may be 
removed.  Merchandise from a port where a contagious disease 
prevails, being liable to communicate the disease, may be excluded; 
and, in extreme cases, it may be thrown into the sea.  This comes in 
direct conflict with the regulation of commerce; and yet no one 
doubts the local power.  It is a power essential to self-preservation, 
and exists, necessarily, in every organized community . . . . 
From the explosive nature of gunpowder, a city may exclude it.  Now 
this is an article of commerce, and is not known to carry infectious 
disease; yet, to guard against a contingent injury, a city may prohibit 
its introduction.  These exceptions are always implied in commercial 
regulations, where the general government is admitted to have the 
exclusive power.  They are not regulations of commerce, but acts of 
self-preservation.  And although they affect commerce to some 
extent, yet such effect is the result of the exercise of an undoubted 
power in the State.316 
Thus, although, “[a] concurrent power in the States to regulate 
commerce is an anomaly,” McLean asserted, 
It does not follow, as is often said, with little accuracy, that, when a 
State law shall conflict with an act of Congress, the former must yield.  
On the contrary, except in certain cases named in the Federal 
Constitution, this is never correct when the act of the State is strictly 
within its powers.317 
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It is hard to see where McCulloch and federal implied powers fit into 
this scheme, yet McLean seems to make room for state implied powers 
to regulate in ways that incidentally affect commerce.  “[W]hen a 
conflict occurs, the inquiry must necessarily be, which is the 
paramount law?  And that must depend upon the supremacy of the 
power by which it was enacted.”318  Federal laws merely incidental to 
enumerated powers may well have to give way to such core interests. 
This notion that conflicts between federal and state law might be 
resolved in favor of the states—contrary to McCulloch and Gibbons—
commanded a consensus on the Taney Court.  Justice Daniel, Barbour’s 
successor as states’-rights advocate from Virginia, put it this way:  “Every 
power delegated to the federal government must be expounded in 
coincidence with a perfect right in the States to all that they have not 
delegated; in coincidence, too, with the possession of every power and 
right necessary for their existence and preservation.”319  How this idea 
would be harmonized with the Supremacy Clause, the Taney Court 
never worked out.  In The License Cases (1847), Justice Grier, a judicial 
moderate from Pennsylvania, offered a suggestion: 
Without attempting to define what are the peculiar subjects or limits 
of this power, it may safely be affirmed, that every law for the 
restraint and punishment of crime, for the preservation of the public 
peace, health, and morals, must come within this category. 
As subjects of legislation, they are from their very nature of primary 
importance; they lie at the foundation of social existence; they are 
for the protection of life and liberty, and necessarily compel all laws 
on subjects of secondary importance, which relate only to property, 
convenience, or luxury, to recede, when they come in conflict or 
collision, “salus populi suprema lex.” 
If the right to control these subjects be “complete, unqualified, and 
exclusive” in the State legislatures, no regulations of secondary 
importance can supersede or restrain their operations, on any ground 
of prerogative or supremacy.  The exigencies of the social compact 
require that such laws be executed before and above all others.320 
This suggestion that courts weigh the relative importance of federal 
laws against state police power laws seems at first blush to undermine 
the principle of federal supremacy.  But it can be harmonized with the 
Supremacy Clause if it is understood “only” as subverting McCulloch.  If 
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federal laws of “lesser importance” are viewed as implied powers—that 
is, federal regulatory inroads into reserved powers that are well-
adapted or convenient to executing enumerated powers—then Grier’s 
opinion is consistent with, and indeed expresses, what the Taney Court 
was trying to say about temperance and immigration laws, as well as 
slavery, and concurrent powers:  that federal implied powers must give 
way to conflicting state police powers of greater importance. Grier 
captures the thrust of these cases in a general principle.  
C.   Avoiding Commerce Exclusivity to Protect Slavery 
Taney Court Justices were far more concerned with practical outcomes 
than with doctrinal consistency.  The first practical concern was to 
preserve state police power regulation in general.  The practical policy 
standing behind the doctrine of commerce exclusivity was one of 
nationwide domestic free trade.  Story’s Miln dissent embraced the free 
trade theory of commerce power, in which “the regulation of a subject . . . 
produces a uniform whole, which is as much disturbed and deranged by 
changing what the regulating power designs to leave untouched, as that 
upon which it has operated.”321  But replacing the dense web of state and 
municipal health, safety, and morals laws with a federal regime of sparse 
regulation could disorder society.  Justice Catron expressed this anxiety in 
The License Cases, arguing that Commerce Clause exclusivity “would 
overthrow and annul entire codes of State legislation” and “expunge 
more State laws and city corporate regulations than Congress is likely to 
make in a century on the same subject.”322 
The majority on the Taney Court may have deemed it unnecessary 
to create a consistent principle of Commerce Clause exclusivity, so 
long as the Court consistently maintained state control over slavery and 
race.  For it was this concern over slavery that primarily drove the 
reverse-McCulloch doctrine of implied reserved state powers.  This 
became crystal clear in Groves v. Slaughter (1841), which raised the 
connection between interstate commerce exclusivity and slavery in the 
starkest possible fashion.323  Groves involved a suit by a slave-trader to 
collect on promissory notes he had received for slaves sold on credit to 
Mississippi residents. The debtors claimed that the promissory notes 
were void because the sales violated a Mississippi constitutional 
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amendment that prohibited the commercial importation of slaves.324  
This ban on interstate slave sales was by no means an anti-slavery law, 
but rather a discriminatory commercial measure designed to bolster 
Mississippi’s internal slave market.325  Daniel Webster and Henry Clay, 
representing the slave dealer, advanced the irrefutable argument that 
the Mississippi provision thus represented the very type of 
protectionism that the dormant Commerce Clause was designed to 
eliminate.326  But to nullify the Mississippi law by applying dormant 
commerce exclusivity, as Webster and Clay urged, would be to 
recognize that the interstate slave trade was within the regulatory 
power of Congress under the Commerce Clause.  This would raise 
serious concerns, both for slave exporting states like Virginia and for 
free states.  The former would fear a congressional ban on the 
interstate slave trade, while the latter would worry that their laws 
against slave importation would be deemed unconstitutional. 
The majority opinion avoided all federal constitutional issues by 
deciding that the Mississippi constitutional provision banning 
interstate slave sales was not self-enforcing—that is, it was ineffective in 
the absence of implementing legislation, of which there was none.327  
This eliminated the debtors’ defense, leaving the notes valid and 
enforceable.  But Justice Baldwin apparently could not bring himself 
to join this artful dodge.  In a separate concurrence in the judgment, 
he argued that slaves were articles of commerce, that the Commerce 
Clause was exclusive, and that therefore the Mississippi law was invalid, 
making the notes enforceable.328  This bit of dissension apparently 
moved the other Justices to state their views on the constitutional 
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questions they intended to avoid.  McLean, like Baldwin, argued that 
the Commerce Clause was exclusive, but differed on whether it 
covered the interstate slave trade.329  McLean said no.  Taney said the 
exclusivity issue had been left open in Miln, the last word on the 
subject.330  Story, Thompson, Wayne, and McKinley issued a joint one-
sentence statement that they “concurred with the majority of the 
Court” that the Commerce Clause “did not interfere with the provision 
of the constitution of the state of Mississippi, which relates to the 
introduction of slaves as merchandise, or for sale.”331 
Thus, six of seven participating Justices in Groves agreed that the 
power to regulate slave trading within a state’s borders was reserved to 
the states, even if the trading crossed state lines.332  Chief Justice Taney 
paid lip service to federal supremacy by allowing that “[n]o one, I 
believe, doubts the controlling power of Congress in this respect; nor 
their right to abrogate and annul any and every regulation of commerce 
made by a state.”333  Yet in almost the same breath, he also asserted, 
[T]he power over this subject [slavery] is exclusively with the several 
states; and each of them has a right to decide for itself, whether it 
will or will not allow persons of this description [slaves] to be 
brought within its limits, . . . and the action of the several states upon 
this subject, cannot be controlled by Congress, either by virtue of its 
power to regulate commerce, or by virtue of any other power 
conferred by the Constitution of the United States.334 
While some of the Justices seemed to view slavery as sui generis—as 
though there were a slavery exception to the Commerce Clause—
others appeared to view slavery as merely a particularly strong form of 
reserved power, in a conception of reserved powers that could fend off 
other forms of federal regulation as well. 
Slavery loomed in the background whenever the Court reviewed a 
state law aimed at protecting the inhabitants of the state from a 
perceived external evil.  The connection between slavery and 
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immigration was built into the Constitution by the Migration or 
Importation Clause, as well as by the fear that admitting free blacks 
into southern states would stir up slave insurrections.335  Thus, in The 
Passenger Cases, Chief Justice Taney emphatically asserted the state’s 
power to exclude “any person, or class of persons, whom it might deem 
dangerous to its peace, or likely to produce a physical or moral evil 
among its citizens,” notwithstanding its incidental effect on foreign 
commerce.336  Justice Grier was more explicit, linking the state’s power 
“to repel from her shores lunatics, idiots, criminals, or paupers, which 
any foreign country, or even one of her sister States, might endeavour 
to thrust upon her” with “the right of any State, whose domestic 
security might be endangered by the admission of free negroes, to 
exclude them from her borders.”337  Even liquor sales raised the slavery 
question for the Taney Court Justices.  In The License Cases, Justice 
Woodbury, Story’s successor from Massachusetts, likened the 
temperance laws at issue to those regulating slaves and immigrants: 
It is the undoubted and reserved power of every State here, as a 
political body, to decide, independent of any provisions made by 
Congress, though subject not to conflict with any of them when 
rightful, who shall compose its population, who become its 
residents, who its citizens, who enjoy the privileges of its laws, and be 
entitled to their protection and favor, and what kind of property and 
business it will tolerate and protect.  And no one government, or its 
agents or navigators, possess any right to make another State, against 
its consent, a penitentiary, or hospital, or poor-house farm for its 
wretched outcasts, or a receptacle for its poisons to health, and 
instruments of gambling and debauchery.  Indeed, this court has 
deliberately said,—‘We entertain no doubt whatsoever, that the 
States, in virtue of their general police power, possess full 
jurisdiction to arrest and restrain runaway slaves, and remove them 
from their borders, and otherwise to secure themselves against their 
depredations and evil example, as they certainly may do in cases of 
idlers, vagabonds, and paupers.’338 
In The Passenger Cases, the dissenters were undoubtedly concerned in 
part with a general salus populi principle that a state must be able to 
protect itself from the side effects of immigration.  There was substance 
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in the judgment) (quoting Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 542–43 (1842)). 
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behind Taney’s claim that “the public history of the times” 
demonstrated “that a fearful amount of disease and pauperism is daily 
brought to our shores in emigrant ships,” thereby threatening public 
health and the state treasury.339  But it is also clear that the prime 
concern was to maintain state control over slavery.  The majority’s 
reasoning, Taney argued, meant that “the emancipated slaves of the 
West Indies have at this hour the absolute right to reside, hire houses, 
and traffic and trade throughout the Southern States, in spite of any 
State law to the contrary; inevitably producing the most serious 
discontent, and ultimately leading to the most painful consequences.”340  
This state power was deemed necessary by dissenters both to prohibit the 
migration or importation of slaves into free states, and to prohibit the 
migration of free blacks into both slave and free states.341  So strong was 
the consensus that slavery-regulation was a reserved state power that it 
transcended other jurisprudential disagreements.  Abolitionist opinion 
was not represented on the antebellum Supreme Court. 
More abstract doctrinal questions were left unresolved.  The Taney 
Court finally reached a compromise on commerce exclusivity in Cooley 
where the Court upheld a municipal pilotage law that required ships 
arriving at Philadelphia to hire local pilots to steer them into port.342  
Municipal pilot laws were unquestionably regulations of navigation and 
hence of commerce; but, a 7–2 majority rejected across-the-board 
Commerce Clause exclusivity, once and for all.  Instead, the Court would 
determine exclusivity on a case-by-case basis.343  Pilotage laws were 
quintessentially in the latter category, according to the Court.344  Under 
Cooley’s regime, commerce exclusivity would be selective, and was left 
hypothetical:  the Court expressly declined to state opinions about “what 
other subjects, under the commercial power, are within the exclusive 
                                               
 339. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 467–68 (Taney, C.J., dissenting). 
 340. Id. at 474. 
 341. See id.; id. at 508 (Daniel, J., dissenting) (contending that the majority’s 
construction of the trade treaty constitutes an “invasion of [states’] domestic security” by 
permitting “British subjects to land within the territory of any of the States cargoes of 
negroes from Jamaica, Hayti, or Africa”); id. at 525–26 (Woodbury, J., dissenting) 
(asserting the right of states to exclude “slaves, or, what is still more common in America, 
in Free States as well as Slave States, exclude colored emigrants, though free”). 
 342. Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (7 How.) 299, 320 (1851). 
 343. “[T]he power to regulate commerce,” Justice Curtis wrote for the Court, 
“embraces a vast field, containing not only many, but exceedingly various subjects, 
quite unlike in their nature; some imperatively demanding a single uniform rule,” and 
others better suited to diverse local regulation.  Id. at 319. 
 344. Id. 
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control of Congress, or may be regulated by the States in the absence of 
all congressional legislation[.]”345  Nor did the Court clarify whether 
federal exclusivity required the presence of federal statutes, or whether 
“collisions” between federal and state law depended on actually 
conflicting objectives. 
In the end, doctrinal consistency in abstract principles regarding 
commerce exclusivity was far less important to the Justices than 
preserving reserved state powers in general and control over slavery in 
particular.  The sharpest disagreement in the Taney Court’s commerce 
power decisions came in The Passenger Cases, where the Justices divided 
five-to-four in striking down the municipal taxes on immigrants.  The 
majority held that a manifest federal policy in favor of open 
immigration nullified restrictive state immigration laws that were not 
especially targeted toward “paupers, vagabonds, or fugitives from 
justice[.]”346  All nine Justices understood that recognizing a federal 
power over immigration, whether under the commerce or treaty 
powers, could, in theory, pose a threat to state slavery regulations.  The 
difference came down to the dissenters’ view that a federal 
immigration power placed state slave regulation on a slippery slope to 
unconstitutionality, and the majority’s view that slavery would be 
sustained because the Court’s unanimously supported state control of 
that issue, no matter what.  As Justice Wayne, who voted to strike down 
the state law, put it, “[t]he exercise of constitutional power by the United 
States, or the consequences of its exercise, are not to be concluded by 
the summary logic of ifs and syllogisms.”347  The dissenters’ fear that “the 
United States may introduce into the Southern States emancipated 
negroes from the West Indies and elsewhere” was unfounded because 
the Court would always interpret the Constitution so as not “to dissolve, 
or even disquiet, the fundamental organization of either of the States”—
that is, to preserve slavery.348 
V.    THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN DOCTRINE 
Antebellum Commerce Clause doctrine developed a robust theory 
of state reserved powers in the context of negative Commerce Clause 
cases to protect the scope of state regulation and to preserve state 
control over slavery.  In the post-bellum and later Lochner eras, the 
                                               
 345. Id. at 320. 
 346. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 410, 426–27 (1849) (Wayne, J., concurring). 
 347. Id. at 429 (Wayne, J., concurring). 
 348. Id. at 428. 
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Supreme Court “imported” the antebellum doctrine into cases testing 
the limits of Congress’s affirmative commerce power.  That is to say, 
they used the antebellum theory of state reserved powers to limit 
federal statutes, rather than to preserve state laws against dormant 
Commerce Clause challenges. 
This aspect of the development of Commerce Clause doctrine has been 
observed by twentieth and twenty–first century Supreme Court opinions 
and commentators.349  But two important features of this transition have 
not been fully explored or have been entirely overlooked.  First, consider 
the frequent Lochner era trope that, absent strong judicial protection of 
reserved state powers, the regulatory powers of the states would be 
“destroyed.”350  While always an exaggeration, this assertion may have had 
at least an element of truth under a nineteenth-century exclusive-powers 
world view in which a grant of power to the federal government meant a 
denial of that power to the states. But that element of truth would 
disappear from a concurrent-powers regime. 
Second, even when the Court did finally begin to apply McCulloch to 
the Commerce Clause at the turn of the twentieth century, it permitted 
only incidental regulation of intrastate commerce, not incidental 
regulation of intrastate non-commercial activities that affected commerce.  
This was the mirror image of Taney Court cases asserting that state 
police powers were not commerce regulations, and therefore not 
precluded by Commerce Clause exclusivity, even though they 
incidentally affected commerce.  The Lochner era Court turned this 
around to say that intrastate subjects of reserved powers were not 
commerce and thus could not be regulated under the commerce power even 
though they affected interstate commerce. 
A.   Implied Commerce Powers in the Lochner Era 
Lochner era Commerce Clause jurisprudence, which can be dated 
from the Court’s decisions in United States v. E.C. Knight Co.351 in 1895 
                                               
 349. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 553–54 (1995); GILLMAN, supra 
note 47, at 20–21 (arguing that Lochner era jurisprudence was fundamentally 
“Jacksonian”); Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, supra note 17, at 590–95 (arguing that 
Lochner-era jurisprudence maintained the narrow ante-bellum interpretation of the 
Commerce Clause that had originated to limit exclusivity). 
 350. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 295–96 (1936); Hammer v. 
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918).  Modern Court conservatives cling to this 
hyperbole.  See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“We have a particular 
duty to ensure that the federal-state balance is not destroyed.”). 
 351. 156 U.S. 1 (1895). 
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to Carter v. Carter Coal Co.352 in 1936, is infamous for its crabbed 
construction of the federal government’s commerce power.353  This 
jurisprudence can be understood as perpetuating a continuous theme:  
a refusal to extend implied commerce powers beyond the incidental 
regulation of intrastate commerce.  The motivations underlying this 
jurisprudence have been variously interpreted as the interjection of 
laissez faire economics into constitutional law or as a vestigial holdover 
of Jacksonian jurisprudence—with its excessive respect for reserved state 
powers and its antipathy to class legislation.  Either way—and there is 
probably an element of truth in both interpretations—the Court’s 
hostility to implied commerce powers in this period is undeniable. 
While the post-Reconstruction Supreme Court reversed the Taney 
Court’s rejection of a federal internal improvements power, it did so 
without relying on McCulloch or a doctrine of implied commerce 
powers.  Instead, it simply analyzed internal improvements as interstate 
commerce itself, in the form of transportation and communications.354  
The main jurisprudential shift, undoubtedly influenced by reformed 
ideas of national sovereignty in the wake of the Civil War, was to 
emphasize the regulatory power of the national government over 
“every foot” of United States soil.355  
But the post-Reconstruction Court continued to adhere to the Taney 
Court’s idea that some matters were reserved to the states so as to 
impliedly block implied federal powers.  One such matter was the 
regulation of private race relations.  In The Civil Rights Cases,356 the Court 
struck down the 1875 Civil Rights Act,357 which prohibited race 
                                               
 352. 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
 353. See, e.g., Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American 
Constitutional Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1, 25–26 (1991).  See generally CHEMERINSKY, 
supra note 70, at 252–59 (describing Lochner-era jurisprudence). 
 354. See California v. Cent. Pac. R.R. Co., 127 U.S. 1, 44–45 (1888) (upholding the 
federal power to charter interstate railroad companies); Pensacola Tel. Co. v. W. 
Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. (6 Otto) 1, 10 (1877) (upholding a federal statute overriding 
state monopolies over telegraph lines). 
 355. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 27 (1890) (“The corporate government established by 
the Constitution is a nation, absolutely sovereign over every foot of soil and over every 
person within the national territory and within the sphere of action assigned to it.”); 
Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 371, 395 (1880) (“[T]he government of the United 
States may, by means of physical force, exercised through its official agents, execute 
on every foot of American soil the powers and functions that belong to it.”); Pensacola 
Tel. Co., 96 U.S. (6 Otto) at 10 (“The government of the United States, within the scope 
of its powers, operates upon every foot of territory under its jurisdiction.”). 
 356. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 357. Id. at 26. 
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discrimination by privately owned hotels, restaurants, and places of public 
amusement.358  The 8–1 majority rejected Justice Harlan’s dissenting view 
that Congress’s power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause created an 
implied power to prohibit private discrimination, under McCulloch and 
the section 5 authorization of “appropriate legislation.”359  To the 
majority, which did not acknowledge McCulloch, Congress had no implied 
power to cover the case, either under the Fourteenth Amendment or the 
Commerce Clause.360  The buying and selling of services could easily have 
been deemed commerce, as a matter of language and logic, and 
multistate discrimination in these transactions would be deemed to affect 
more states than one in the twentieth century.361  But, the Court in 1883 
flatly stated “[o]f course, no one will contend that the power to pass [the 
law] was contained in the Constitution before the adoption of the last 
three amendments.”362  That is to say, it was somehow obvious to the Court 
that the Commerce Clause could not authorize the law.  Yet, at the same 
time, the Court in this era recognized a federal commerce power over 
race relations on interstate transportation.363 
Thanks in large part to Justice John Marshall Harlan, whose 
admiration for his judicial namesake seems to have induced him to an 
effort to revive McCulloch as an important precedent, the Court began 
to rely on McCulloch increasingly around the turn of the twentieth 
century to extend the reach of the commerce power.364  Revisionist 
                                               
 358. Id. at 9. 
 359. Id. at 51–52 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 360. Id. at 18 (majority opinion). 
 361. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964); 
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 302 (1964). 
 362. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 10. 
 363. See id. at 19 (reserving the question of whether Congress could prohibit private 
discrimination on interstate transportation facilities under the Commerce Clause).  It 
happens, however, that the decisions always applied to preserve segregated 
transportation facilities.  See Chiles v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 218 U.S. 71, 77 
(1910) (permitting railroads to impose racial segregation on interstate passengers 
absent contrary legislation by Congress); Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Kentucky, 179 
U.S. 388, 394 (1900) (upholding Kentucky law that required railroad companies to 
provide separate seating for black and white passengers); Louisville, New Orleans & 
Tex. Ry. Co. v. Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587, 592 (1890) (rejecting dormant commerce 
clause challenge to Mississippi law requiring segregated railroad cars); Hall v. DeCuir, 
95 U.S. (5 Otto) 485, 490 (1877) (striking down a Louisiana ban on racial segregation 
of passengers as an interference with interstate commerce). 
 364. See, e.g., Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321, 355 (1903); In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 578 (1895); 
Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 472 (1894).  See generally DAVID S. 
2019] AN ERROR AND AN EVIL 1001 
 
legal historians have plausibly questioned characterizations of the 
Lochner era as a monolithic jurisprudential period marked by a laissez 
faire judicial philosophy and the consistent striking down of federal 
economic regulation.365  Viewed in granular detail, the Court’s record 
can appear mixed in the 1895–1936 period; some variation was 
undoubtedly explained by shifting Court majorities, while even some 
more conservative Justices acknowledged at least some federal 
regulatory power over commerce.366 
Yet that revisionism tends to miss the forest for the trees. The 
conventional account better captures the big-picture reality that the 
conception of implied commerce powers before 1937 remained highly 
restricted.367  The Court was far more consistent than otherwise in its 
approach to the commerce power.  The power to regulate things that 
were not strictly “interstate commerce” was limited to intrastate 
commerce.  Thus, for example, the Court recognized that Congress 
could regulate intrastate railroad rates where necessary to effectuate 
interstate rate regulation.368  Congress could not regulate such 
intrastate activities as manufacturing or employment pursuant to the 
federal antitrust laws, but those laws could reach intrastate price fixing 
for goods in a national market.369  And Congress could regulate 
interstate trade and intercourse to promote health, safety, or morals.370  
In some of these cases, the Court cited McCulloch and discussed implied 
                                               
SCHWARTZ, THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION:  JOHN MARSHALL AND THE 200-YEAR ODYSSEY OF 
MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND (forthcoming 2019) (book manuscript on file with author). 
 365. David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised:  Lochner and the Origins 
of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 2, 4 (2003). 
 366. See id. at 10–12. 
 367. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 299 (1936); Hammer v. 
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276–77 (1918), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 
100, 116–17 (1941). 
 368. See, e.g., Houston E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 351 
(1914); The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 399 (1913). 
 369. Compare United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 17 (1895), with Stafford 
v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 518–19 (1922); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 401 
(1905); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 248 (1899). 
 370. See Hoke & Economides v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 321–22 (1913) 
(upholding the regulation of lottery sales); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 
45, 58 (1911) (upholding the federal regulation of adulterated products); McCray v. 
United States, 195 U.S. 27, 63–64 (1904) (upholding the regulation of 
oleomargarine); Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321, 357 (1903) (upholding the federal 
regulations of “morals” of citizens). 
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powers;371 in others, it did not.372  But the Court was consistent in 
recognizing only two legitimate ends of implied commerce power:  to 
regulate intrastate commerce or to exercise a “national police power” 
over the health, safety, or morals aspects of interstate trade.  
Employment could be regulated only when the employees were 
directly engaged in interstate transportation.373  The commerce power 
extended only to trade-or-transport activities or to matters “directly 
related” to such activities.  The direct/indirect effects test that emerged 
in this period boiled down to little more than an acknowledgment that 
intrastate trade-or-transport activities could be regulated if they had 
interstate effects.  But intrastate activities that fell outside the traditional 
definition of commerce—buying, selling, and transportation—could 
not be regulated.  The Court consistently held this position throughout 
the Lochner era, as marked by the era’s three anti-canonical cases:  E.C. 
Knight in 1895, Hammer v. Dagenhart374 in 1918, and Carter Coal375 in 1936.  
Each case held that employment and the production of goods were 
intrastate activities whose regulation was reserved to the states, and 
therefore off limits to the commerce power.376  The commerce power 
jurisprudence of this era is summed up by a single arresting sentence in 
Carter Coal:  “In exercising the authority conferred by [the Commerce 
Clause] of the Constitution,” the Court said, “Congress is powerless to 
regulate anything which is not commerce . . .”377 
Critics argued then and now that these cases were based on 
incoherent distinctions, or were at odds with other precedents, or 
both.378  The criticisms are largely true, and they get no argument here.  
Yet the critics understate how much the Lochner-era cases were 
thematically unified by adhering to the Taney Court’s conception of 
reserved state powers under the Tenth Amendment.  The Lochner-era 
Courts continued to view production and employment as immune from 
                                               
 371. Hipolite Egg Co., 220 U.S. at 58; McCray, 195 U.S. at 63. 
 372. Hoke & Economides, 227 U.S. at 323; Lottery Case, 188 U.S. at 357–58. 
 373. Second Employers’ Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 51–52 (1912). 
 374. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276–77 (1918). 
 375. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 299 (1936). 
 376. Id.; Hammer, 247 U.S. at 272; United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. a1, 12 (1895). 
 377. Carter, 298 U.S. at 297. 
 378. See, e.g., E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. at 21–22 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Raoul 
Berger, Judicial Manipulation of the Commerce Clause, 74 TEX. L. REV. 695, 711–12 (1996); 
Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1229–
36 (1986); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr. & Grant S. Nelson, A Critique of the Narrow Interpretation 
of the Commerce Clause, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 695, 707 (2002). 
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implied commerce powers.  What appeared inconsistent was the 
acknowledgment that Congress could exercise police powers over 
health, safety, and morals by regulating the interstate flow of goods, but 
could not regulate production or employment by the same legislative 
technique.379  Yet that could be explained as a concession by the Court 
of a limited inroad into reserved state powers:  Congress was in effect 
granted a limited police power, concurrent with the states, to regulate 
health, safety, or morals through the regulation of interstate trade. 
B.   From Exclusivity to Preemption 
The Taney Court established a robust theory of reserved state powers 
that blunted the reach of implied commerce powers, in order to 
protect state regulation from excessive dormant commerce preclusion, 
and to maintain state control over slavery.  In the post-Reconstruction 
era, the Court continued to apply a fairly robust theory of reserved 
state powers, even as one of the main conceptual supports for this 
theory evaporated.  Specifically, the concern that broad commerce 
powers would nullify great swaths of state law was neutralized by 
doctrinal changes around the beginning of the twentieth century. 
In the early 1900s, the Court subtly shifted from a predominantly 
negative commerce to a preemption approach for coordinating state 
and federal regulation of commerce.380  Increasingly, the Court analyzed 
challenges to state statutes affecting interstate commerce by considering 
whether a federal statute, rather than the inherently preclusive effect of 
the Commerce Clause, displaced the state law.381  This was at least in part 
an effect of the increasing number and scope of federal statutes.  As 
Congress began to regulate more under the commerce clause in the late 
nineteenth century, challengers to state laws began to make arguments 
resembling present day statutory field preemption arguments.382  By 1912, 
the Court had begun inquiring into the preemptive intent of the statutes 
in question.  In Savage v. Jones,383 for example, the Court stated that: 
                                               
 379. Compare Hammer, 247 U.S. at 272, with Hoke & Economides v. United States, 227 
U.S. 308, 321–22 (1913); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45, 58 (1911); McCray 
v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 63–64 (1904); Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321, 355 (1903). 
 380. See, e.g., Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912). 
 381. See, e.g., id. 
 382. See, e.g., Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Haber, 169 U.S. 613, 638–39 (1898) 
(rejecting a field-preemption-type argument that state prohibition on importing 
diseased cattle was preempted by the 1891 Animal Industry Act). 
 383. 225 U.S. 501 (1912). 
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the intent to supersede the exercise by the State of its police power 
as to matters not covered by the Federal legislation is not to be 
inferred from the mere fact that Congress has seen fit to 
circumscribe its regulation and to occupy a limited field.  In other 
words, such intent is not to be implied unless the act of Congress 
fairly interpreted is in actual conflict with the law of the State.384 
The cause and timing of the shift from negative commerce to 
preemption analysis warrants further inquiry from legal historians.  
What is clear is that the Court made no announcement of a doctrinal 
shift, tending instead to obscure the shift by purporting to apply older 
negative commerce cases as if they were statutory preemption cases.385 
The result of these developments was quiet but significant.  The leading 
Commerce Clause decisions that affected the revolution in Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence between 1937 and 1942, discussed in the next 
sections, did not address the concurrent powers problem because, by 
1937, it was no longer a problem.  It is not coincidental that modern 
preemption doctrine is generally traced to a case decided in this era.386 
C.   Implied Commerce Powers and the New Deal Turnaround 
The hallmark of the New Deal’s almost legendary transformation of 
U.S. constitutional law was the Court’s recognition of the idea that 
Congress could regulate intrastate matters that were not traditional 
buying-selling-transporting commerce.  This recognition did not occur 
all at once.  NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.387 famously marked the 
turning point between the Court’s pre- and post-New Deal 
jurisprudence.  There the Court upheld the Wagner National Labor 
Relations Act of 1935,388 and took the first step on a path by which it 
                                               
 384. Id. at 533; accord Napier v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 612–13 
(1926); see also McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 135–37 (1913) (finding that 
state labeling law conflicted with the federal Food and Drug Act). 
 385. In Savage itself, the Court offered as an “abundant illustration” of its statutory 
intent approach a string of cases upholding state statutes against dormant commerce 
clause challenges—that is, claims that the state law violated the exclusivity of the 
Constitution’s grant of federal commerce power rather than a particular federal 
statute.  See Savage, 225 U.S. at 533–34; see also Napier, 272 U.S. at 611 (mis-citing Reid 
v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137 (1902), a dormant commerce case, as though it were a 
statutory preemption case). 
 386. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000) (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 
312 U.S. 52 (1941), as the leading case for “well-established preemption principles”). 
 387. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
 388. Id. at 30 (explaining that the NLRA guarantees employees the ability to 
organize, unionize, and engage in collective bargaining). 
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would thereafter uphold all New Deal legislation and all Commerce 
Clause legislation for the next sixty years.389  Momentous a shift as it was, 
Jones & Laughlin retained a good deal of pre-1937 jurisprudential 
baggage, which the Court would not jettison until four years later, when 
a majority of the Court were Roosevelt appointees.390  Compared to 
Darby and Wickard, Jones & Laughlin is a sort of halfway house between 
the discredited late Lochner-era cases like Carter Coal, and modern 
Commerce Clause doctrine.391 
Jones & Laughlin receives undue precedential respect because it 
came out the right way.  This is unfortunate, since it was chock-full of 
crabbed phrases from soon-to-be repudiated decisions.  Chief among 
these is the old saw from Justice Cardozo’s concurrence in A.L.A. 
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,392 that failing to enforce strict 
limits on the commerce power would “obliterate the distinction 
between what is national and what is local and create a completely 
centralized government.”393  This language would later be plucked out 
and deployed by the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts when striving to 
reimpose limits on the commerce power.394  Yet, Cardozo’s Schechter 
quotation was in fact said in service of doctrinal claims that are no 
longer good law. Among others, the Jones & Laughlin opinion 
continued to recognize that the Tenth Amendment supported a 
concept of reserved state powers that commerce regulation could not 
“invad[e].”395 And Jones & Laughlin further asserted that, if the NLRA 
had attempted to reach beyond “matters which directly affect” 
                                               
 389. KENNETH R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32844, THE POWER TO 
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 392. 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
 393. Id. at 554 (Cardozo, J., concurring quoted in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 
301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937); see also id. at 30 (failure to enforce strict limits on the commerce 
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v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 555 (1995).  
 395. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 29–30. 
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commerce, “the Act would necessarily fall.”396  This “direct effects” test 
was authoritatively rejected in Darby and Wickard.397 
Not surprisingly, Jones & Laughlin maintained the longstanding 
practice of declining to apply McCulloch’s broad conception of implied 
powers to the Commerce Clause.  The Court flirted but briefly with the 
idea of implied commerce powers, noting that “the power to regulate 
commerce is the power to enact ‘all appropriate legislation’ for ‘its 
protection and advancement.’”398  But then the opinion quickly reins 
in that statement by clarifying that intrastate activities can be regulated 
only “if they have such a close and substantial relation to interstate 
commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that 
commerce from burdens and obstructions.”399  Tellingly, the sources 
cited for these assertions were not McCulloch or even Gibbons, but rather 
cases like Schechter Poultry and The Daniel Ball (1871) (the source of the 
“protection and advancement” quote),400 the latter authored by states’ 
rights hardliner Justice Stephen Field.  In marked contrast to Jones & 
Laughlin, McCulloch did not limit implied powers to those having a 
“close and substantial relation” to the primary power.401 
D. The Real New Deal Transformation:   
Breaking Down Reserved State Powers 
In 1941 and 1942, the Court decided three cases that, unlike Jones & 
Laughlin, really ushered in modern commerce power doctrine:  United 
States v. Darby Lumber Co., United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co.,402 and 
Wickard v. Filburn.  Though the cases tend to be lumped together, there 
is a subtle but important difference between the first two opinions, by 
Harlan Fisk Stone, and the third opinion by Robert Jackson. 
In Darby, the Court upheld the application of the federal Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) to a lumber company that sold its 
products on the interstate market.403  The law included minimum wage 
                                               
 396. Id. at 29–31 (“It is a familiar principle that acts which directly burden or 
obstruct interstate or foreign commerce, or its free flow, are within the reach of the 
congressional power.”). 
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 401. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 404 (1819). 
 402. 315 U.S. 110 (1942). 
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and maximum hours provisions, as well as a prohibition on interstate 
shipment of goods produced in violation of the act.404  Justice Stone’s 
opinion for a unanimous Court explicitly overruled Hammer v. 
Dagenhart, and impliedly disapproved all prior precedents holding that 
employment and productive activities, such as manufacturing, were 
local regulatory matters reserved to the states and, therefore, outside 
the reach of the commerce power.405  The Court reached that 
conclusion by applying McCulloch to the Commerce Clause: 
The power of Congress over interstate commerce is not confined to the 
regulation of commerce among the states.  It extends to those activities 
intrastate which so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the 
power of Congress over it as to make regulation of them appropriate 
means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise of the granted 
power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce . . . .406 
Congress, having by the present Act adopted the policy of excluding 
from interstate commerce all goods produced for the commerce 
which do not conform to the specified labor standards, it may choose 
the means reasonably adapted to the attainment of the permitted 
end, even though they involve control of intrastate activities.407 
Federal “control of intrastate activities” was henceforth no longer 
limited to intrastate commerce strictly construed as buying, selling, 
and transporting.  Rather, the means to effectuate federal commerce 
regulation could extend to the direct “suppression” of manufacturing 
in violation of the labor standards.408  Significantly, the Court began its 
legal analysis by stating that “While manufacture is not of itself interstate 
commerce, the shipment of manufactured goods interstate is such 
commerce[.]”409  Early twentieth century precedents had applied 
McCulloch only to enable Congress to regulate intrastate commerce as an 
adjunct to its interstate commerce regulation. In marked contrast, 
Darby for the first time acknowledged an implied commerce power to 
regulate interstate things that were concededly not commerce. 
This assertion amounted to an attack on the traditional Tenth 
Amendment conception of reserved powers as including set categories 
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of things that could not be reached by federal regulation—again, such 
as employment and production. Stone made this explicit by 
announcing that the Court’s conclusion was “unaffected by the Tenth 
Amendment . . . [which] states but a truism that all is retained which 
has not been surrendered.”410 
This pithy sentence represented a tectonic shift in federalism 
doctrine.  No longer would the Tenth Amendment be viewed as a 
repository of defined subject matter immune from federal regulation 
regardless of the requirements of interstate commerce regulation.  
“From the beginning and for many years the amendment has been 
construed as not depriving the national government of authority to 
resort to all means for the exercise of a granted power which are 
appropriate and plainly adapted to the permitted end,” said Stone.411  
This is questionable history.  In citing McCulloch at the end of this 
passage, Stone perceived the conflict between a robust theory of implied 
federal powers and a robust theory of reserved state powers. And he 
resolved the conflict in favor of federal power.  He dismissed “[w]hatever 
doubts may have arisen of the soundness of that conclusion” as mere 
recent developments that “have been put to rest” since 1937.412 
Wrightwood Dairy, decided the next year, is far less known and 
anthologized than Darby and Wickard; but, it is comparably important 
in establishing the new doctrine.  In upholding a federal law 
establishing milk price supports, Wrightwood Dairy extended the 
commerce power principles of Darby, which had involved a company 
that shipped its products interstate, to a local dairy that did no 
interstate business.  Stone (now Chief Justice) noted that the factual 
record showed that interstate milk prices, which could concededly be 
regulated under the commerce power, tended to be pulled down by 
“the unregulated sale of the intrastate milk.”413  Because Congress 
could reasonably conclude that it needed to regulate intrastate milk 
prices as part of regulating the interstate market, it could do so under 
its commerce power.  Here, the Court laid out two alternate 
formulations of the doctrine that underlay its ruling, the first based on 
McCulloch and implied powers. 
Congress plainly has power to regulate the price of milk distributed 
through the medium of interstate commerce . . . . and it possesses 
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every power needed to make that regulation effective.  The 
commerce power is not confined in its exercise to the regulation of 
commerce among the states.  It extends to those activities intrastate 
which so affect interstate commerce, or the exertion of the power of 
Congress over it, as to make regulation of them appropriate means 
to the attainment of a legitimate end, the effective execution of the 
granted power to regulate interstate commerce.414 
The second is based on Gibbons’ definitional approach. 
The power of Congress over interstate commerce is plenary and 
complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and 
acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the 
Constitution . . . .  It follows that no form of state activity can 
constitutionally thwart the regulatory power granted by the 
commerce clause to Congress.  Hence the reach of that power 
extends to those intrastate activities which in a substantial way 
interfere with or obstruct the exercise of the granted power.415 
One might be tempted to say that these tests are the same.  True, 
both allow Congress to regulate things that are not themselves either 
interstate or commerce.  But there is a difference.416 
The McCulloch formulation uses interstate “effects” as a placeholder 
for the means-ends connection set out in McCulloch for implied powers. 
This approach applies McCulloch’s implied powers framework to 
Congress’s commerce powers just as it would apply to any other 
enumerated power.  It positions Congress to exercise its discretion to 
determine whether a particular regulation is “conducive” or “plainly 
adapted” to exercising its power to regulate interstate commerce. 
The Gibbons formulation, of course, is recognizable as the modern 
“substantial effects” test.  It rolls the regulation of intrastate matters 
into the definition of the federal commerce power.  That is to say, it 
purports to interpret the Commerce Clause itself as authorizing 
Congress to regulate intrastate matters that substantially affect 
interstate commerce.  Unlike the McCulloch approach, which would 
apply the Necessary and Proper Clause to the Commerce Clause to 
produce implied commerce powers, the Gibbons definitional formula 
relies on interpretive doctrine overlaid on the Commerce Clause itself.  
More importantly, the substitution of a substantiality requirement for 
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McCulloch’s more lenient and deferential formula of 
“conduciveness”—with the degree of conduciveness left to the 
discretion of Congress—suggests a more inquisitive judicial role and is 
thus potentially more limiting. 
In Wickard, issued nine months after Wrightwood Dairy, the Court 
famously rejected a challenge to wheat-production quotas under the 
1938 Agricultural Adjustment Act417 and upheld application of the Act 
to a relatively small plot of wheat intended for use on the farmstead 
rather than for sale on the open market.418  Although often described 
(somewhat exaggeratedly) as the most far-reaching application of the 
commerce power,419 Wickard is merely an incremental extension of 
Wrightwood Dairy, which applied the commerce power to purely 
intrastate selling.  In Wickard, the Court simply made good on its 
assertion in Wrightwood Dairy that the commerce power could be 
extended to intrastate activities that were not in themselves 
commerce.420  The Wickard Court announced the “aggregation” 
principle, under which, the court measures the substantial effects of 
an intrastate activity on interstate commerce by viewing the activity in 
the aggregate, as a class of activities.421  But this principle was implicit 
in Wrightwood Dairy, where the regulation was upheld against a single 
local dairy producer.422  And, of course, the aggregation principle is 
hardly novel, as it is implicit in all laws that regulate individual 
instances of behavior to control the aggregate effects of that behavior. 
Indeed, in a crucial sense, Wickard was not as broad in its doctrinal 
implications as Wrightwood Dairy because it failed to apply McCulloch to 
the Commerce Clause, and therefore did not establish a clear 
recognition of implied commerce powers.423  Jackson’s opinion cites 
McCulloch just once, in a footnote, for the proposition that conflicting 
economic interests underlying a regulatory scheme “are wisely left 
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under our system to resolution by the Congress.”424  The citation is 
unexplained and seems inapt.  Instead, Jackson relies heavily on 
Gibbons, where “Chief Justice Marshall described the federal commerce 
power with a breadth never yet exceeded.”425 In other words, for 
Jackson, the Gibbons definitional approach was sufficient to cover the 
case:  the substantial effects test was built into the proper interpretation 
of the Commerce Clause and required no reference to implied powers.  
The government had defended the statute as an exercise of implied 
commerce powers, relying heavily on McCulloch and not once citing 
Gibbons.426  But Jackson does not mention implied powers in the 
opinion, and barely refers to the Necessary and Proper Clause.427 
E.   Rethinking the Lopez “Mustbesomething” Rule 
1. NFIB redux 
Since Wickard, the Gibbons-definitional approach to construing the 
federal commerce power has predominated over the McCulloch-
implied-powers approach.  Hornbook Commerce Clause doctrine 
features the “substantial effects test” rather than asking whether a 
regulation of intrastate matters is conducive or plainly adapted to 
effectuating the regulation of interstate commerce.  In most cases, the 
distinction is academic.  In NFIB, it may have made a difference. 
To be sure, there is a certain naiveté in suggesting that doctrine 
dictates the results of close or highly-contested constitutional cases.  
The five conservative Justices in NFIB had sufficient motivation, 
whether in judicial philosophy or political preference, to mold the 
doctrine to reach a particular result.  But the definitional approach 
facilitated the Justices’ rather forced argument that “inactivity” cannot 
be regulated as commerce, while the McCulloch approach would have 
made for a harder sell. 
The winning argument on the Commerce Clause issue in NFIB 
stemmed from the wording of the substantial effects test that dated back 
to Darby.  The post-New Deal Court consistently spoke of the commerce 
power as extending to regulation of intrastate “activities” of one sort or 
                                               
 424. Id. at 129 n.29. 
 425. Id. at 120. 
 426. Brief for the Appellants on Reargument at 43–45, Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 
111 (1942) (No. 59). 
 427. Justice Jackson mentions the Necessary and Proper Clause just twice, once to 
summarize the government’s argument and a second time, in passing, in an historical 
summary of Commerce Clause jurisprudence.  Wickard, 317 U.S. at 119, 121. 
1012 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:927 
 
another.428  The Court’s meaning should have been clear:  as in the 
manner of implied powers, Congress can regulate things that are not 
interstate commerce if doing so is necessary and proper to regulating 
something that is interstate commerce.  There is no constitutional basis 
for insisting that those non-commercial things constitute “action” rather 
than “inaction.”  Linguistically, it is clear that the word “activities” in the 
New Deal cases was a mere placeholder, and that the Court could as well 
have said “matters” or “subjects” or “things” to the same effect.  Had it 
done so, the almost absurd fussiness of the activity/inactivity distinction 
in NFIB would have been more plainly exposed.  Instead, by making the 
inquiry “one of definition,” to quote Marshall’s original phrase, the 
Gibbons approach gave the NFIB conservatives cover to ask whether 
sitting out of the health insurance market fell within the definition of 
“activity” and therefore of “commerce.” 
The insistence on a rigorous adherence to the meaning of “activity” 
would have been harder to sustain rhetorically under McCulloch’s 
implied powers approach.  As made clear by Justice Scalia’s 
concurrence in Raich, the extent of Congress’s implied commerce 
powers does not turn on the definitions of words, but on the practical 
relationship between a specific element of a regulation and the 
effectiveness of the greater regulatory whole.429  In Raich, it was the 
relationship between home-growing and simple possession of 
marijuana, on the one hand, and the effectiveness of a ban on 
interstate distribution of marijuana, on the other.430  In NFIB, it was the 
relationship between individual decisions to opt out of the health 
insurance market and the viability of that market as a whole.  But the 
substantial effects test derives from the Gibbons definitional approach 
to commerce regulation; this makes it superficially more defensible to 
ask whether the proposed regulation of intrastate matters fits the 
definition of “commerce power.”  As noted above, there was really no 
plausible way to argue that the individual mandate was not “conducive” 
to regulating the interstate health insurance market.  Professor Randy 
Barnett quipped that Justice Scalia “would not even have to break a 
sweat” to distinguish away his McCulloch-based concurrence in Raich in 
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order to rule against the individual mandate in NFIB.431  Scalia may not 
have broken a sweat in joining the joint dissent in NFIB, but that’s only 
because he simply ignored his opinion in Raich, rather than doing the 
untenable intellectual heavy-lifting of distinguishing it. 
2. Normative justification for a “mustbesomething rule” 
The refusal of five Justices in NFIB to embrace the full extent of 
implied commerce powers lacks the normative justifications that 
motivated nineteenth century Justices.  Since the mid-twentieth 
century, our jurisprudence has abandoned the idea that race relations 
are best regulated at the state level—a change that was long overdue.  
And the broad acceptance of concurrent federal and state power to 
regulate commerce long ago rendered the dire concerns over 
Commerce Clause exclusivity a non-issue. 
The normative justifications for reserved state powers doctrine are 
based on a conceptual error and a constitutional evil, and thus can’t 
serve as valid justifications in our constitutional order.  The error was 
the inability to conceive of concurrent federal and state commerce 
powers.  The constitutional evil was the accommodation of slavery and 
later Jim Crow by leaving individual states to decide for themselves how 
best to regulate race relations. 
This is not to say that restoring content to reserved powers of the 
states—for instance, the activity/inactivity distinction relied upon by 
the five conservatives in NFIB—lacks a normative basis.  Defenders of 
the distinction, including the Justices themselves, claim that imposing 
ad hoc definitional limits on implied commerce powers promotes 
liberty, in an anti-regulatory libertarian sense.  Whether that is true as 
a factual matter, or justified as a constitutional doctrine, is debatable.  
What is clear, however, is that that justification lacks the historical 
pedigree that is sometimes claimed for it.  Laissez faire or libertarian 
constitutionalism was not the driving force behind reserved state 
powers and their limitation on implied commerce powers for most of 
the nineteenth century. 
CONCLUSION 
The United States has always been a commercial nation, and this fact 
was a driving force behind the grant of a federal commerce power and 
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indeed behind the calling of the Philadelphia Constitutional 
Convention itself.  Constitutional thinkers seem to have known, as 
Daniel Webster observed, that “[a]lmost all the business and 
intercourse of life may be connected, incidentally, more or less, with 
commercial regulations.”432  The judicial recognition of implied powers 
in McCulloch thus held enormous potential for the expansion of federal 
regulatory power in the form of implied commerce powers. But this 
expansion was delayed by more than a century due to anxieties about its 
potential to eliminate swaths of state and municipal laws under the 
nineteenth century concept of exclusive federal commerce power.  
Above all, nineteenth and early twentieth century Justices seemed 
concerned to maintain reserved state powers as a bulwark against 
implied commerce powers in order to preserve the states’ powers to 
regulate slavery and, after its abolition, to impose racial segregation. 
The two pillars underlying the Court’s century of resistance to 
applying McCulloch to the Commerce Clause to find implied commerce 
powers—concern about commerce clause exclusivity and state control 
over race relations—are long gone.  Yet the decision of the five Court 
conservatives in NFIB to exclude the health insurance mandate from 
the federal commerce power reflects the vestigial continuation of this 
resistance.  The normative justification for a contemporary limit on 
implied commerce powers, a libertarian constitutionalism, is a 
relatively recent arrival on the scene.  Its adherents must fight their 
battle for constitutional interpretive preference without claiming 
longstanding historical roots. 
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